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 COMPARING IMPEACHMENT REGIMES 
JOHN OHNESORGE* 
Impeachment, whether of presidents, judges, or other government 
officials, is increasingly common in political systems around the world, most 
importantly in presidential systems, where it can be used to remove heads of 
state who otherwise serve fixed terms.  Despite this existence of a common 
and important legal tool in many jurisdictions, comparative scholarship on 
impeachment is rare, especially by legal scholars.  This article responds to 
that scarcity by offering a methodological approach upon which future 
comparative impeachment scholarship can draw.  The approach addresses 
many of the legal and political issues that impeachment raises, and 
incorporates insights from both law and political science, based on a belief 
that impeachment cannot be fully understood through either a purely legal 
or purely political lens.  In order to construct this approach, this article 
draws on characteristics of the impeachment regimes of the United States 
and the Republic of Korea, which differ along several important dimensions 
and can thus be used to highlight different approaches to common issues.  
The goal is to demonstrate the value of comparative impeachment 
scholarship to those who seek to understand impeachment more deeply, 
whether as scholars or as citizens. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution does not guarantee four-year terms for 
American presidents. Presidents serve for four years or until removed from 
office through impeachment.1  Likewise, American federal judges do not 
enjoy lifetime appointments under the Constitution; they hold office as long 
as they wish or until removed through impeachment or conviction.2  
Although no one would dispute the accuracy of these statements, they do not 
reflect the way Americans commonly talk about the tenures of presidents or 
federal judges because impeachment in the United States is so rare.3 In the 
entire history of the United States, the House of Representatives has 
 
 1.  Impeachment is typically a two-stage process. Charlie Savage, How the Impeachment Process 
Works, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/us/politics/impeachment-
trump-explained.html [https://perma.cc/BH7W-2QSU]. Generally, a legislative body first adopts a bill of 
impeachment that functions like an indictment against the accused official, which is then adjudicated by 
a second body. Id. In this essay “impeachment” will be used to refer to the action of the first body, whether 
or not the process ultimately results in a conviction and sanction by the adjudicating body. Thus, for 
example, U.S. presidents Andrew Johnson, Bill Clinton and Donald Trump were impeached by the House 
of Representatives, though not convicted by the Senate. See id. Additionally, U.S. presidents can also be 
removed pursuant to Section 4 of the 25th Amendment, though that has never been used. Miles Parks, 
What the 25th Amendment Says About Removing a Sitting President, NPR (Jan. 7, 2021, 2:15 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/insurrection-at-the-capitol/2021/01/07/919400859/what-happens-if-the-
president-is-incapacitated-the-25th-amendment-charts-a-cours [https://perma.cc/V3MQ-P66W] (“It’s 
become a frequent topic throughout the Trump presidency, but the 25th Amendment has never actually 
been used before to take powers away from a president without his consent.”). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Branches of the U.S. Government, USAGOV (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.usa.gov/ 
branches-of-government#item-214500 [https://perma.cc/JC6F-4CYK] (last visited Mar. 27, 2021) (“The 
president leads the country. He or she is the head of state, leader of the federal government, and 
Commander in Chief of the United States armed forces. The president serves a four-year term and can be 
elected no more than two times.”). 
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impeached twenty officials—only eight of whom have been convicted and 
removed by the Senate.4 Impeachment is infrequent in the U.S. because the 
applicable rules governing impeachment, found primarily in the Constitution 
but also in the rules of the houses of Congress, intentionally function together 
with our political structures and culture to make it so. 
The word “infrequent,” an inherently relative term, invites comparison. 
Americans may feel that presidential impeachments are rare, but other 
countries with presidential systems also have impeachment mechanisms, and 
perhaps they use them even less frequently.5  That could be because their 
rules are more restrictive, or perhaps because of how their political 
institutions work. Other societies might also resort to presidential 
impeachment more often. So often, perhaps, that the possibility of 
impeachment would become part of the way to think about presidential 
terms. Would such frequent resort to presidential impeachment be a good 
thing, for the “shotgun behind the door” to be so close at hand, or would that 
destabilize a political system premised upon significantly insulating the 
executive branch from the legislative, as presidential systems are?  he answer 
may depend upon what other alternatives to impeachment are available. If 
military coups are a real possibility, as has been true in many countries, an 
increased use of impeachment may be a healthy development.6  Whether 
frequently or infrequently used, however, impeachment is an important 
 
 4.  See List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives, HISTORY, ART & 
ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES [hereinafter List of Individuals Impeached], 
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachment/Impeachment-List/ [https://perma.cc/659K-QHDV] 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2021). In addition to the eight convicted and removed by the Senate, some officials 
that were subjected to impeachment inquiries chose to resign rather than contest the process to the end, 
including President Richard Nixon. Nixon Resigns, HISTORY (Aug. 5, 2020), 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nixon-resigns [https://perma.cc/UV2U-VB6R]. 
 5.  There is a vast literature comparing and contrasting parliamentary, presidential, and semi-
presidential political systems. See, e.g., José Antonio Cheibub et al., Beyond Presidentialism and 
Parliamentarism, 44 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 515 (2014) (investigating whether the defining characteristics 
that distinguish presidential and parliamentary constitutions predict other attributes that are 
stereotypically associated with these institutional models). For purposes of this essay, the important 
difference between presidential and parliamentary systems is that in the former the president, the head of 
the executive branch, is significantly independent from the legislature because he or she is directly elected 
for a fixed term. Id. at 518–19. This desire was famously reflected in James Madison’s objection, during 
the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, to the inclusion of “maladministration” as a ground for 
impeachment, which he felt would leave the President too vulnerable to removal by the House and Senate. 
See Jared P. Cole & Todd Garvey, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46013, IMPEACHMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 
1, 7 (2019). For a brief and timely comparison of presidential and parliamentary systems in holding chief 
executives accountable, see Grant Havers, Parliament or Congress: Which System Better Holds 
Executives Accountable?, LAW & LIBERTY (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.lawliberty.org/2020/01/ 
30/parliament-or-congress-which-system-better-holds-executives-accountable/ [https://perma.cc/4NG3-
LRB9]. 
 6.  See infra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. 
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institution of presidential democracies, a safety valve to remove individual 
leaders without threating democratic regimes themselves. 
And what about judges and executive branch officials other than heads 
of state? The reasons for insulating judges from the legislature may differ 
from the reasons for insulating presidents and the executive branch, but 
should impeachment be used less often against judges, or more?7  If 
impeachment should be used differently against judges, should the formal 
requirements differ, or is it preferable to have a common set of rules and to 
trust that the politicians operating the impeachment process will calibrate it 
appropriately?8  Finally, what about executive branch officials below the 
President? The U.S. Constitution allows impeachment of “all civil Officers 
of the United States,”9 and while the exact scope of “civil Officers” is 
debated,10 impeachment clearly extends beyond the President. Despite 
occasional threats, impeachment has almost never been used against lower 
executive branch officials in the U.S..11  Should that change, and if so, how 
would that affect the balance of power between the executive and legislative 
branches, especially if presidential impeachments remained rare? Every 
political system that employs impeachment has to face such questions 
because deciding how impeachment should be structured, legally and 
politically, depends upon normative judgments about how impeachment 
should function.12 Those judgments are ultimately for the citizens of each 
 
 7.  Concerns about individual due process in adjudications are a primary difference between the 
impeachment processes for judges versus presidents, but not the only ones. A judiciary free from 
legislative branch control is also crucial for enforcing constitutional checks and balances. 
 8.  Under the U.S. Constitution the rules are not the same, as federal judges “hold their Offices 
during good Behaviour,” but the import of the differences is a matter of debate. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; 
see infra note 73. 
 9.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 10.  For an analysis of officer status in a related context, see generally Officers of the United States 
Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73–74 (2007) [hereinafter O.L.C., 
Officers of the United States] (concluding that under the Appointments Clause, a position is a federal 
office “if (1) it is invested by legal authority with a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal 
government, and (2) it is ‘continuing’”). 
 11.  See generally DAVID E. KYVIG, THE AGE OF IMPEACHMENT: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
CULTURE SINCE 1960, at 30 (2008) (describing the impeachment and Senate acquittal of Secretary of War 
William W. Belknap). On threats to impeach executive branch officials, see, e.g., Justin Wise, Warren 
Renews Call for Barr to Resign over Roger Stone Sentencing, HILL (Feb. 12, 2020, 12:43 PM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/482764-warren-renews-call-for-barr-to-resign [https://perma.cc/ 
3NB2-PMMC]; George F. Will, Opinion, Congress Should Impeach the IRS Commissioner—or Risk 
Becoming Obsolete, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-
should-impeach-the-irs-commissioner-or-risk-becoming-obsolete/2016/09/09/bae91306-75ee-11e6-
8149-b8d05321db62_story.html [https://perma.cc/2XET-HAZF]. 
 12.  Although impeachment is usually discussed at the national level, in federal systems it may exist 
at the state or local levels as well. For example, U.S. state constitutions contain impeachment 
mechanisms, and some contain citizen recall mechanisms as well. See Recall of State Officials, NAT’L 
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country to make, but their decisions do not need to be made in isolation.  
Although unique, political systems share enough in common to make 
comparative study useful, especially when considering something as rare but 
impactful as impeachment. 
In Judge Richard Posner’s retrospective on the effort to impeach U.S. 
President Bill Clinton, he noted the rarity of comparative studies on 
impeachment, despite the fact that the mechanism exists in many legal 
systems.13 In the nearly two decades since Judge Posner’s book appeared, 
there have been presidential impeachments in several of the world’s 
democracies, large and small.14 Of particular interest, South Korean 
 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 8, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-
of-state-officials.aspx [https://perma.cc/2TWL-Z5P6]. Recall votes, unlike impeachment, place removal 
under the direct control of the electorate, rather than requiring that removal be done through elected 
representatives, as in impeachment. Id. Many executive branch officials below the chief executive are 
appointed, not elected, but it isn’t obvious that removing appointed officials through voter recall is a 
worse method than removing them through impeachment—the method adopted in the U.S. Constitution. 
Voter recall is not available against any U.S. government official, but even a quick look at how recall is 
used in American states provides interesting food for thought. For example, while many states limit recall 
to elected officials, typically governors or state legislators, others extend it to other state officials, 
including state judges in some cases. Id. At least one state, New Jersey, allows recall of its federal 
members of Congress. Id. Some states try to require that recall be based on wrongdoing, an attempt to 
constrain recall that would be similar to constraining impeachment by requiring an impeachable offense. 
Id. Other states do not require reasons for recall, thus seeming to endorse the idea that recall should be an 
entirely political process. Id. Another interesting state level practice is to allow both recall and 
impeachment, as is the case in Arizona. Id. In 1988, the opponents of Arizona Governor Evan Mecham 
had gathered enough signatures to trigger a recall vote, but the legislature impeached him before the recall 
was carried out. Id. 
 13.  RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL 
OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 100 n.20 (1999) (“American students of impeachment are provincial; they do 
not study the foreign experience.”). 
 14.  For example, Philippine President Joseph Estrada was targeted with impeachment in 2000, and 
though ultimately not convicted, he resigned from office after the Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme 
Court preemptively swore in his vice president as president. Yuko Kasuya, Weak Institutions and Strong 
Movements: The Case of President Estrada’s Impeachment and Removal in the Philippines, in CHECKING 
EXECUTIVE POWER: PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 45 (Jody C. 
Baumgartner & Naoko Kada eds., 2003). In 2012, Fernando Lugo was successfully impeached and 
removed as the president of Paraguay. Leiv Marsteintredet et al., Paraguay and the Politics of 
Impeachment, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 110, 111 (2013). President Lugo was the second president of Paraguay 
to have his term “interrupted” by that process. See Arturo Valenzuela, Latin American Presidencies 
Interrupted, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 8 (2004) (noting that the first president of Paraguay to be interrupted 
was Raúl Cubas). Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff was removed from office after impeachment and 
conviction in 2016. Simon Romero, Dilma Rousseff Is Ousted as Brazil’s President in Impeachment Vote, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/world/americas/brazil-dilma-
rousseff-impeached-removed-president.html [https://perma.cc/G59H-TWVZ]. She was the second 
Brazilian president, after Fernando Collor de Mello, to be removed via impeachment under Brazil’s 
present constitution. Naoko Kada, Impeachment as a Punishment for Corruption? The Cases of Brazil 
and Venezuela, in CHECKING EXECUTIVE POWER: PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 14, at 113. Attempts were also made to impeach Brazilian presidents Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso and Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, though all ultimately failed. Rodrigo Zeidan, 
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President Noh, Moo-hyun was impeached in 2004. Although the Korean 
Constitutional Court decided against removing him from office, Noh later 
chose to resign.15 South Korea experienced another impeachment in 2016 
when President Park, Gun-hye was impeached by Korea’s National 
Assembly.16 Unlike President Noh, her removal was ordered by the Korean 
Constitutional Court.17 
Despite regular use of impeachment to challenge presidents around the 
world—to say nothing of impeachment efforts against judges and other 
government officials—Judge Posner’s observation remains largely 
accurate.18  Impeachment—by any measure, a drastic step in a democracy—
is not actually that rare, yet it is rarely studied comparatively, especially by 
legal academics. Moreover, what legal academics have written about 
impeachment in jurisdictions other than their own is not necessarily 
comparative, or may contain just casual comparative observations.19 Political 
 
Impeachment and the New Democracy in Brazil, PRAGMATIC ECON. & SUSTAINABLE FIN. (Apr. 16, 
2016), https://rzeidan.com/2016/04/16/impeachment-and-the-new-democracy-in-brazil/ [https://perma. 
cc/UKP8-5EHM]. More recently, political opponents of Philippine President Duterte introduced an 
impeachment bill in the lower house of the Philippine legislature. Felipe Villamor, Philippines Kills 
Impeachment Complaint Against Rodrigo Duterte, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-impeachment.html [https:/ 
/perma.cc/PP3X-TVF6]. President Kuczynski of Peru resigned in the face of a second impeachment 
attempt, having narrowly survived the first. Ryan Dube, Peru’s President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 
Resigns, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2018, 7:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/perus-president-pedro-
pablo-kuczynski-resigns-1521661203 [https://perma.cc/3DNV-ZBA6]. 
 15.  John Ohnesorge, Impeachments Compared: Presidents Roh and Clinton in Law and Politics, 
in SITUATING KOREAN STUDIES IN A GLOBAL AND MULTI-DISCIPLINARY CONTEXT: PROCEEDINGS FOR 
2ND INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON KOREAN STUDIES (2006); Youngjae Lee, Law, Politics, and 
Impeachment: The Impeachment of Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional Perspective, 53 
AM. J. COMP. L. 403, 412 (2005); Hahm Chaihark, Professor, Yonsei Univ., Discussion at the Hills 
Governance Center at Yonsei’s 2nd Symposium on Public Governance: Impeachment and the Korean 
Constitutional Order (Mar. 22, 2004). 
 16.  Uk Heo & Seongyi Yun, South Korea in 2017: Presidential Impeachment and Security 
Volatility, 58 ASIAN SURV. 65, 65 (2018); Hyun-Soo Lim, A Closer Look at the Korean Constitutional 
Court’s Ruling on Park Geun-hye’s Impeachment, YALE J. INT’L L. (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.yjil.yale.edu/a-closer-look-at-the-korean-constitutional-courts-ruling-on-park-geun-hyes-
impeachment/ [https://perma.cc/KY9P-DM2A]. 
 17.  Heo & Yun, supra note 16, at 65–66. 
 18.  But see Tom Ginsburg et al., The Uses and Abuses of Presidential Impeachment, 88 U. CHI. L. 
REV. (forthcoming) (discussing, through a comparative analysis, how impeachment can be better 
understood as a tool through which political systems may reset their leadership by triggering new 
elections); Daniel H. Erskine, The Trial of Queen Caroline and the Impeachment of President Clinton: 
Law as a Weapon for Political Reform, 7 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 1 (2008) (illustrating, through 
a comparative analysis, how the impeachment process has historically been used as a “political 
weapon . . . . to instigate political change . . .”). Posner’s observation was never true in one fundamental 
respect, as U.S. discussions of impeachment, from the Founding until today, generally assume that 
England’s impeachment experience is relevant to our own. For an excellent introduction to English 
practice in relation to the U.S., see Editorial, 3 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 285 (1974). 
 19.  See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF 
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scientists have made greater efforts to systematically compare impeachment 
regimes,20 though they also often note the scarcity of such work.21 
Symptomatic of this disregard, scholars at the core of the Comparative 
Constitutions Project, which applies sophisticated political science methods 
to the comparative study of constitutions, wrote in 2013 that, “governments 
in presidential systems do not risk removal from power in the middle of their 
term.”22 The authors were drawing a distinction between presidential and 
parliamentary systems, in which leaders of the executive branch are 
responsible to the legislature, but by ignoring the possibility of presidential 
impeachment they over-state the distinction.  Presidents are being removed 
in the middle of their terms via impeachment, and the way impeachment 
works in a political system tells much about the actual independence of the 
president from the legislative branch. This in turn matters both for 
comparative politics scholarship and, perhaps more importantly, for citizens 
of presidential systems who wish to think more deeply about the possibilities 
and limits of their political orders. 
This essay responds to the scattered state of comparative impeachment 
research by proposing a general framework to structure future scholarship, a 
framework constructed by identifying and exploring issues common to 
impeachment regimes.  These issues are identified primarily through the 
study of two quite different impeachment regimes, those of the United States 
and South Korea (Korea).23  The list of issues discussed is not intended to be 
exhaustive, but the U.S. and Korean systems differ from one another in 
 
IMPEACHMENT 26–27 (2018) (making casual reference to the approaches that some U.S. state 
constitutions, and some foreign constitutions, take when defining impeachable offenses, without citing a 
foreign authority). Youngjae Lee’s excellent article about the impeachment of South Korean President 
Noh, is framed primarily as a case study, but contains thoughtful comparative observations, particularly 
with respect to the U.S. impeachment regime. See Lee, supra note 15. 
 20.  See, e.g., ANÍBAL PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT AND THE NEW POLITICAL 
INSTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA 38 (2007) (providing a table listing impeachment attempts in Latin 
America in the 1990s and early 2000s and their outcomes); Kasuya, supra note 14 (conducting a 
comparative analysis of the impeachment processes in the United States, the Philippines, Colombia, 
Madagascar, Russia, Brazil and Venezuela). 
 21.  Jody C. Baumgartner, Introduction: Comparative Presidential Impeachment, in CHECKING 
EXECUTIVE POWER: PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 14, at 3. 
 22.  Cheibub et al., supra note 5, at 519 (emphasis added). For more on the Comparative 
Constitutions Project, see Zachary Elkins et al., The Comparative Constitutions Project: A Cross-National 
Historical Dataset of Written Constitutions (July 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/research-design-cataloging-the-contents-of-constitutions/ 
[https://perma.cc/JK24-9FD8]. 
 23.  For a helpful summary of the South Korean impeachment process, see Choe Sang-Hun, South 
Korea’s Impeachment Process, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Sang-Hun, South 
Korea’s Impeachment Process], https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/world/asia/impeaching-south-
korea-president.html [https://perma.cc/9D6N-4J8E]. 
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several important ways,24 which makes the two countries useful in this 
framework-building exercise.25 
A framework that compares scholarship on impeachment must pay 
attention to both comparative law and politics because impeachment is both 
a legal and political process. As will be shown, the black-letter law of 
impeachment matters, both the law that determines how impeachment fits 
within the larger governance system and the law that governs the 
impeachment process itself. Even if the black-letter law of impeachment 
were identical in Korea and the U.S., however, the countries’ institutions 
would likely implement those rules differently, suggesting limits to the 
usefulness of a solely legal comparison. Focusing on implementation of the 
is always important in comparative research, but the fact that political bodies 
play central roles in implementing impeachment law gives impeachment as 
practiced an irreducibly political element. Studying rules, structures and 
processes cannot fully capture what impeachment means for a society,26 or 
answer normative questions such as how frequent impeachment should be. 
What impeachment ultimately means for a society, however, and whether 
the system requires changing, is inextricably linked to the law, the practice, 
and the politics of impeachment. 
Studying impeachment comparatively will deepen our understanding of 
constitutional law and practice around the world, and provide material to 
 
 24.  Specifically, the U.S. is the world’s oldest democracy characterized by having the following 
traits: a purely presidential system, an old constitutional text, a stable two-party system in which the 
parties regularly alternate in holding the presidency and the two houses of the legislature, a common law 
heritage, a powerful judiciary enforcing separate powers, and a system of checks and balances among the 
three branches. Korea, on the other hand, is a comparatively new democracy that is characterized as: 
having grown out of non-communist authoritarianism, being fundamentally presidential but having a 
prime minister, having a modern German-influenced constitution, a fractious and constantly changing 
party structure, a civil law system, and a Constitutional Court—in addition to a Supreme Court—that has 
become noteworthy for its assertiveness and is tasked with adjudicating impeachments in South Korea’s 
system. Lee, supra note 15, at 406–08; Lim Jibong, The Korean Constitutional Court, Judicial Activism, 
and Social Change, in LEGAL REFORM IN KOREA 19 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2004); TOM GINSBURG, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 206–46 (2003).  
 25.  This study thus differs from more traditional comparative projects, which often draw on one 
system to provide lessons for the other. See, e.g., John Yoo, The Influence of the States in Constitutional 
Change: A Comparison of American and Korean Approaches to Constitutional Amendment, 18 J. 
KOREAN L. 157 (2018). 
 26.  Meaning refers here to how an impeachment is understood in the public consciousness of a 
society. Meaning can vary in magnitude, and meaning can also be contested. Thinking of meaning in this 
way, the impeachment and removal of a trial judge caught accepting bribes is likely to be of low and 
uncontested meaning. There are many trial judges, and few citizens are likely to believe that judges who 
accept bribes belong on the bench. The impeachment and acquittal of President Clinton, on the other 
hand, was arguably both highly meaningful and highly contested. For essays exploring the meaning of 
the Clinton impeachment, see AFTERMATH: THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT AND THE PRESIDENCY IN THE 
AGE OF POLITICAL SPECTACLE (Leonard V. Kaplan & Beverly I. Moran eds., 2001) [hereinafter Kaplan 
& Moran]. 
JO. IMPEACHMENT MACROS(DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2021  8:31 PM 
2021] COMPARING IMPEACHMENT REGIMES 267 
those who want to think more deeply about impeachment in their societies. 
A way to study impeachment comparatively that will facilitate attention to 
both law and politics is through the comparison of impeachment regimes, 
consisting of substantive law, usually constitutional, procedural rules and 
practices, and political forces and institutions.  Impeachment regimes can 
function in ways that are over or under-inclusive, providing too much or too 
little of the good for which they are created, so over and under-inclusion is a 
useful device for analyzing elements of such regimes.  Because citizens 
ultimately evaluate their country’s impeachment regime, the goal of the 
exercise should be to facilitate thoughtful analysis and critique, rather than 
provide answers. 
This essay begins with an extended discussion of methodology, 
necessary given the novelty of the topic and the approach, followed by an 
application to the two countries examined.  Section II discusses approaches 
to conducting comparative impeachment scholarship, identifying difficulties 
and possible objections, and then lays out the approach this essay ultimately 
adopts.  Section III develops this framework for comparison, focusing first 
on the concept of impeachment regimes, then discussing the device of over 
and under-inclusion as a frame for analysis.  Section IV discusses issues that 
help determine the place of impeachment within a society’s larger 
constitutional order, while Section V addresses procedural and substantive 
legal standards of impeachment itself. Section VI addresses political 
structures and behavior to establish the context within which impeachment 
functions, while Section VII offers closing observations, as well as 
suggestions for future research. 
II. APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE IMPEACHMENT 
SCHOLARSHIP 
Comparative law scholars have been admirably open about the 
methodological challenges the field faces. A comparative study of 
impeachment law and practice will certainly be open to challenge on various 
grounds. 27  Rather than anticipating and responding to such challenges, this 
essay rejects several approaches, then introduces the approach that will be 
followed. 
One framework to comparative impeachment research would be a 
doctrinal comparison of black-letter impeachment law across various 
countries.  That approach would have the advantage of simplicity, allowing 
legal scholars to remain within their traditional domain, legal doctrine, and 
would contribute to the field because black-letter impeachment law does 
 
 27.  See, e.g., Mathias Siems, Book Review, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 462 (2017). 
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matter for how impeachment functions. Such an approach will not be 
followed here for two reasons.  First, even key doctrines such as the 
definition of an impeachable offense include irreducibly political elements 
because impeachment is administered, partially or wholly, by political 
bodies. Second, granting that useful insights could follow from the 
comparison of black-letter law, at present , when attention to the field has 
been so limited, a more holistic approach is called for. Although this essay 
will pay substantial attention to the legal rules governing impeachment, it 
will seek to build a framework that situates these within a broader political 
and social frame. 
An attractive alternative to black-letter comparison would be to 
compare countries based on variations in their impeachment systems to 
measure the effects of such differences on non-legal metrics.28  One could 
easily imagine comparative impeachment scholarship looking at the 
difference between impeachment regimes, like Korea’s, that utilize courts to 
adjudicate impeachments and those that use non-courts, typically upper 
houses in bicameral legislative systems such as the U.S.  Such an approach 
could improve greatly over black-letter comparison by explicitly taking into 
account wider institutional contexts within which impeachment rules 
operate, and would also facilitate empirical research by allowing the use of 
large data sets. An obvious risk in that approach, however, would lie in 
applying common labels to institutions that are formally similar, but that 
might operate very differently in different societies, and also hold different 
socio-political meanings for the citizens of different societies. At this point, 
when so little comparative work on impeachment has been done, building a 
general framework on such a foundation should be done with care. It would 
be a mistake to go too far in the other direction, however, to focus so heavily 
on contextual details, social, political, historical, that the particularities of the 
individual impeachment regimes would overwhelm what they share in 
common. Such an anthropological approach would be important for 
elucidating the meaning of impeachment within a particular society,29 but 
unsuited to comparing different impeachment regimes. 
Scholarly literature in the field of comparative politics contains more 
work on impeachment than comparative law, but that literature is also 
flawed.  To their credit, the political scientists have begun the important task 
of developing models to facilitate comparison of impeachment across 
 
 28.  The Comparative Constitutions Project is designed to facilitate this type of work. See Elkins et 
al., supra note 22. For a recent study conducted relying on data collected by the Comparative 
Constitutions Project see, Joe Amick et al., On Constitutionalizing a Balanced Budget, 82 J. POL. 1078 
(2020). 
 29.  See, e.g., Kaplan & Moran, supra note 26. 
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different political systems.30  Unfortunately, however, some of the scholars 
believe that if impeachment is a political phenomenon it cannot at the same 
time be a legal phenomenon.  For example, Jody Baumgartner and Naoko 
Kada write that “[t]he basic assumption of this book . . .  is that impeachment 
is a political, rather than a legal proceeding.  In other words, this book is 
about the politics of presidential impeachment.”31  A few pages later they 
write, “we take the position that presidential impeachment can only be 
understood as a political phenomenon.”32  The same stance is then adopted 
by other contributors to the volume as though it were an important 
commitment tying together their research.33  The stance is questionable, 
however, as even the contributors to that volume almost universally discuss 
legal issues in their chapters.34  That political scientists are unable to write a 
book about the politics of impeachment without covering a good deal of the 
law of impeachment shows why framing impeachment as being solely a legal 
or a political phenomenon is misguided.35  Impeachment is both political and 
legal, and just as understanding one country’s experience with impeachment 
requires studying both its law and its political and social structures, a 
framework for comparing impeachment regimes must incorporate both legal 
and extra-legal factors.36 
 
 30.  See, e.g., PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, supra note 20, at 132–75; Kada, supra note 14, at 137. 
 31.  Baumgartner, supra note 21, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 32.  Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 33.  See, e.g., William B. Perkins, The Political Nature of Presidential Impeachment in the United 
States, in CHECKING EXECUTIVE POWER: PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 
supra note 14, at 21.  
 34.  Baumgartner identifies the “The Institutional Balance of Power,” and the “Constitutional and 
Statutory Provisions for Impeachment” as the first two of five factors that condition presidential 
impeachments. Baumgartner, supra note 21, at 7–8. Both of these factors describe formal legal rules and 
structures. 
 35.  For an example of the political-therefore-not-legal framing in the popular press, see, e.g., 
Andrew C. McCarthy, George Will’s Call for Impeachment of the IRS Director, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 8, 
2015, 2:11 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/george-wills-call-impeachment-irs-director-
andrew-c-mccarthy/ [https://perma.cc/3KXP-6X5U] (“Impeachment . . . is a political remedy, not a legal 
one . . . .”) (emphasis in original). 
 36.  In defense of the political scientists, they may be reacting to the tendency of legal academics to 
write about impeachment as if it were primarily a legal matter. It is unlikely that legal scholars believe 
that impeachment can be fully understood without serious attention to politics, yet they have a tradition 
of producing law-centric works on the subject. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S 
GUIDE (2017). Other works taking largely legal approaches would include TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 
19; CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE 
FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (1996); RAOUL 
BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (enlarged ed. 1974). Like scholarship that 
focuses on the political aspects of impeachment, law-centric impeachment scholarship can be extremely 
valuable so long as its limitations are understood. For example, a classic topic of law-centric impeachment 
scholarship is the legal definition of an impeachable offense, which is an important undertaking because 
that definition will affect how the impeachment regime functions, even if it does not fully constrain the 
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Given these limitations and concerns, this essay proposes an approach, 
encompassing both legal and non-legal factors, designed to help generate 
useful knowledge about impeachment as practiced around the world.  
Variations in impeachment regimes reflect choices, and bringing those 
choices to light will help evaluate the implications of those choices.  The 
goal is to provide a framework to assist people— scholars, citizens, lawyers, 
politicians— in understanding impeachment across political systems so that 
they are better able to think about impeachment in their own societies.  The 
stakes for political legitimacy are high because impeachment can address 
problems not easily addressed through other means.  A single corrupt 
legislator will be only one vote in a collective body and can be replaced at 
the next election, but a corrupt or incompetent head of state could use 
influence over the executive branch and foreign affairs to inflict substantial 
harm on a society before the next election.  The stakes are also high with 
respect to judicial impeachments, as corrupt or incompetent judges may 
threaten the integrity of their legal systems where impeachment is not 
available to overcome protections traditionally designed to ensure judicial 
independence. 
III. COMPARING IMPEACHMENT REGIMES 
Section III.A explains the comparison of impeachment regimes, defined 
to include both law and politics, while Section III.B suggests a metric across 
which impeachment regimes could be compared. 
A. Impeachment Regimes not Impeachment Law 
Although impeachment is like a criminal prosecution in that one body 
investigates and brings charges and a second body adjudicates based on facts 
and law, impeachment has a role for politics that the criminal process does 
not.  This is not politics in the sense that a judge deciding a case arguably 
engages in politics when choosing between two possibly applicable rules, or 
crediting one version of the facts over another.37 Impeachment is irreducibly 
 
bodies that apply the definition. We must assume that members of Congress who vote on impeachments 
will be interested in reelection, and that how they vote on an impeachment may be a salient issue the next 
time they face voters. Politicians’ impeachment behavior will therefore take place in the shadow of the 
country’s substantive legal standard, even if not governed fully by it. A related but more defensible 
framing is that impeachment is a political rather than a judicial process. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, 
Impeachment is a Political Process, Not a Judicial One, LAW.COM: NAT’L L. J. (Dec. 10, 2019, 12:46 
PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/12/10/impeachment-is-a-political-process-not-a-
judicial-one/?slreturn=20210206145428 [https://perma.cc/74TP-8QLE]. Morrison’s argument is that 
because judicial review of impeachment decisions is not available in the U.S., it is important not to see 
the impeachment process as a judicial one. Id. He is careful to note, however, that legal principles like 
due process still matter in impeachments, just not as grounds for judicial review. Id. 
 37.  That sense of the political nature of judicial decision making has been associated with the 
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political because political bodies perform one or both of these roles.  It is a 
feature of impeachment that politicians, organized political parties, civil 
society groups, and individual citizens can mobilize for and against a 
potential impeachment.  Understanding a nation’s impeachment regime thus 
requires study of its laws and legal institutions, as well as its politics. 
The political background of the 2020 President Trump impeachment 
proceedings and their subsequent fallout is emblematic of the fact that 
impeachments are rarely purely legal.  As the 2020 presidential elections 
approach in the U.S., Republicans and Democrats must decide how to make 
best use of the reality that the Democrats’ control of the House of 
Representatives allowed them to impeach President Trump, but that the 
Republicans’ hold of the Senate allowed them to block his removal.38  Before 
the impeachment, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and others downplayed 
impeachment to appeal to moderates, while other Democrats championed it 
to appeal to their own supporters.39  Cognizant that impeachment is partly a 
legal process, pro-impeachment Democrats in the House and Senate argued 
that Trump had committed impeachable “high crimes and misdemeanors,”40 
whereas Republicans seeking to rally their supporters argued that he had not, 
and that the Democratic impeachment effort was thus an illegitimate effort 
to undo the 2016 presidential election.41  The 2020 elections will provide a 
vehicle for examining these processes, and while it might be a mistake to 
predict that many voters’ judgements will be swayed by purely legal 
arguments, if the impeachment is an important issue in the election the 
debates will be carried out at least partly in the discourse of legality.  This is 
one reason why law-centric impeachment scholarship is important. In 
addition, there are aspects of impeachment regimes, such as evidentiary 
standards or procedural rules, that shape how impeachment actions proceed, 
but are difficult for non-specialists to fully appreciate.  Law-centric 
impeachment scholarship therefore has an important role to play in 
addressing certain types of issues. 
 
indeterminacy theses of the American legal realism and critical legal studies movements. See, e.g., 
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997) (examining the effect of politics on judicial 
decision making and how law made by judges affects American politics).  
 38.  Lindsay Wise, Post-Impeachment Senate Landscape Takes Shape, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2020, 
5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/post-impeachment-senate-landscape-takes-shape-11582021802 
[https://perma.cc/8AJS-CDKZ]. 
 39.  Jonathan Martin, Republicans Seize on Impeachment for Edge in 2018 Midterms, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/us/politics/trump-impeachment-midterms.html 
[https://perma.cc/KW7Q-3UGH].  
 40.  See id. (quoting Representative Steve Cohen) (“I think he’s committed impeachable 
offenses . . . .”). 
 41.  Warren Davidson (@WarrenDavidson), TWITTER (Dec. 10, 2019, 3:19 PM), 
https://twitter.com/WarrenDavidson/status/1204495768826105857 [https://perma.cc/HH7V-JY6H].  
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A perennial challenge for those seeking to understand the U.S. 
impeachment regime is a lack of certainty about the rules of engagement, but 
the role of political bodies in the process builds in much of that uncertainty.  
The grounds of impeachment themselves, “other high crimes and 
misdemeanors,” are highly indeterminate, but mechanisms that the Anglo-
American legal tradition typically relies upon to constrain textual 
indeterminacy, such as a significant history of past applications, applied in 
the case at hand by a trained judiciary displaying a substantial respect for 
precedent, do not exist in the U.S. impeachment context.42  As will be 
discussed more fully,43 there are simply too few past impeachments to 
provide guidance, but more fundamentally, while the members of the House 
and the Senate could decide for themselves to treat past cases as precedential 
in a judicial sense, or could perhaps treat leading scholarly interpretations or 
past English cases as persuasive authority, an institutional framework like 
the one that pressures judges to respect precedent and persuasive authority 
does not exist with respect to members of the House and the Senate. 
B. Evaluating Impeachment Regimes: Over and Under Inclusiveness, or 
Not-Too-Much-Not-Too-Little Goods 
Legal scholarship regularly employs over and under-inclusiveness as a 
device for discussing black-letter law,44 and legal doctrine incorporates the 
device as well.45  With certain adjustments, over and under inclusion can also 
be used as a device for comparing and evaluating impeachment regimes, 
considering both those regimes’ black-letter law and their enforcement 
mechanisms.46  A similar approach using more familiar language is to 
understand impeachment as an example of what Laurence Lessig has called 
a “[n]ot-[t]oo-[m]uch-[b]ut-[n]ot-[t]oo-[l]ittle [g]ood[].”47 Whether with 
respect to presidents, other officers, or judges, it is clear that the possibility 
of impeachment is important as a legitimate, peaceful way to remove bad 
 
 42.  A potentially important issue that will not be addressed here is whether impeachment regimes 
in Common Law and Civil Law jurisdictions differ in their approach to precedent. 
 43.  See infra Section V(C). 
 44.  A rule is said to be over-inclusive if it is worded to capture conduct beyond what was intended, 
and under-inclusive if the opposite is true. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 
751 (8th Cir. 2005). For example, if the voting age is set at eighteen to ensure a mature electorate, that 
rule will be over-inclusive because it will exclude some mature citizens under eighteen from voting, but 
will also be under-inclusive for allowing some immature citizens over eighteen to vote. 
 45.  See, e.g., Victory Processing, L.L.C. v. Fox, 937 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that 
Montana’s statute restricting robot calls violated the First Amendment for being both over-inclusive and 
under-inclusive). 
 46.  The following discussion draws upon BLACK, JR., supra note 36, at 14–24. 
 47.  Lawrence Lessig, Law Regulating Code Regulating Law, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2003). 
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actors, but it is equally clear how a resort to impeachment would sacrifice 
important values of the system. 
The constitutional grounds for impeachment, for example, would be 
under-inclusive if they would not allow impeachment even if an official had 
committed serious misconduct, but would be considered over-inclusive if 
they allowed impeachment for even a trivial offense.48  An under-inclusion 
objection was in fact raised by Col. Mason during the American 
Constitutional Convention of 1787, when he argued that limiting the grounds 
for impeachment to treason and bribery would mean that the mechanism 
would “not reach many great and dangerous offences.”49  Mason’s 
suggestion for addressing the problem was to add “maladministration” as a 
third ground, to which Madison offered an over-inclusion objection, arguing 
that allowing impeachment for “maladministration” would give the Senate 
too much discretion to remove the President.50  The phrase “other high 
crimes and misdemeanors” was then included rather than 
“maladministration,” and subsequent discussions of the scope of that phrase 
often employ the logic of over and under inclusion.51 
The South Korean constitution provides an example of the same 
challenge, though it only allows impeachment upon proof of a violation of 
existing law.52  By itself, such a rule appears under-inclusive, as an official 
might commit acts deserving of impeachment that would not violate existing 
law.53 Grossly irresponsible personal behavior, or flagrant lying to the public 
with respect to matters of policy, would be examples.  Korea’s choice to tie 
impeachment to violations of law would also be over-inclusive if interpreted 
to allow impeachment for any violation of law, no matter how trivial. 
 
 48.  It is important to recognize that deciding what is over- or under-inclusive depends on 
substantive judgments concerning issues, such as the wrongfulness of conduct and the effect of an 
impeachment on society. 
 49.  The exchange is reproduced in BLACK, JR., supra note 36, at 28. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See, e.g., id. at 33–36. Black’s suggestion for dealing with the potential over- and under-
inclusiveness of “high crimes and misdemeanors” was to apply the interpretative canon ejusdem generis, 
cabining the scope of that phrase by linking its interpretation to the specific grounds of treason and bribery 
which it follows. Id. at 36–41. He did not address the likelihood that the members of the House and the 
Senate would apply that or any other interpretive canon in their impeachment decisions. Id. 
 52.  See DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 65(1) (S. Kor.) (requiring a 
finding of a violation of “the Constitution or other laws in the performance of official duties,” in order 
for a motion to be passed for impeachment). 
 53.  Black explored the possibility of interpreting “high crimes and misdemeanors” to include only 
violations of law—achieving through interpretation what South Koreans wrote in their constitution—and 
concluded that it would be both over- and under-inclusive for the reasons given here. BLACK, JR., supra 
note 36, at 33–36.  
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Problems of over and under-inclusiveness in the ordinary legal system 
can be addressed through sensible judgments by those who operate the 
system, particularly police, prosecutors, and judges.  Impeachment regimes 
present a greater challenge in this regard because of the entirely legitimate 
role of the legislative branch, in which political interests and organized 
political parties play leading roles.  Understanding an impeachment regime 
thus requires taking into account the actual functioning of political 
institutions, which is based on the alignment of political forces in the society, 
and attributes of specific parts of the regime may not track the performance 
of the regime as a whole.  For example, even a regime such as Korea’s that 
allows impeachment for a “violation of law” will not function in an over-
inclusive way unless the enforcement system allows it to do so. This is 
largely true in the ordinary legal system as well, with respect to which we 
are used to understanding the enforcement discretion of police and courts.  
What makes impeachment regimes unique is the roles that elected 
legislatures and political parties play in the enforcement process, especially 
in countries like the U.S., in which the judiciary’s role is extremely limited.54  
Returning to the discussion at America’s Constitutional Convention, when 
Madison complained that allowing impeachment for “maladministration” 
would mean that the President would serve, in effect, at the pleasure of the 
Senate, Governeur Morris responded that the ground of maladministration 
“will not be put in force [and] can do no harm.” 55  Morris appears to have 
intuitively accepted one of the points argued explicitly here, that an 
impeachment regime is a function both of the rules and of the enforcing 
institutions, though it might have been more persuasive had he explained 
why he believed the Senate could be trusted not to push “maladministration” 
to the extremes feared by Madison. 
The issues that an impeachment regime can raise for a political system 
depends upon how the broader system is designed.  With respect to 
 
 54. See BERGER, supra note 36, at 108–26 (arguing against total denial of judicial review in cases 
of impeachment); Vikram David Amar, Exactly What Are the Rules Concerning Supreme (or Other 
Federal) Court Review of Impeachment Proceedings?, VERDICT (May 13, 2019), https:// 
verdict.justia.com/2019/05/13/exactly-what-are-the-rules-concerning-supreme-or-other-federal-court-
review-of-impeachment-proceedings [https://perma.cc /VM8Z-NH3K]. Chief Justice Roberts’s decisions 
in presiding over President Trump’s impeachment trial in the Senate largely confirmed this stance, 
especially in his statement that he would not have cast a tie-breaking vote on a controversial procedural 
motion, an action that would have been very typical for a U.S. Vice-President presiding over ordinary 
Senate business. Jacqueline Thomsen, Roberts, Acknowledging He’s ‘Unelected,’ Declares It 




 55.  BLACK, JR., supra note 36, at 28. 
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presidential impeachment, the major issue in the U.S. is the balance of power 
between the two elected branches, the Presidency and Congress, as discussed 
by James Madison and Governeur Morris.56  In Korea, on the other hand, 
because the Constitutional Court serves as the adjudicating body in 
impeachment cases, the balance between all three branches is implicated.57  
Despite these differences, one basic task of both impeachment regimes is the 
same: to set boundaries on the conduct of the countries’ presidents.  Both 
Korea and the U.S. rejected parliamentary systems, in favor of presidential 
systems, and over-inclusive impeachment regimes would undermine that 
model by subjecting the presidents to the supervision of the legislature 
(U.S.), or the legislature and the Constitutional Court (Korea).  An under-
inclusive impeachment regime would also not be desirable because the 
possibility of impeachment must be high enough to deter misbehavior, or 
allow the peaceful removal of a duly elected president should the need 
arise.58 
While at first glance the problems of too much impeachment and too 
little appear symmetrical, the harms caused by too little impeachment may 
be more serious.  In the case of a successful presidential impeachment, if the 
electorate feel that the impeachment was inappropriate they will be able to 
express their views in the next legislative election.  In this way the 
democratic process itself, provided it is working properly, provides a self-
correction mechanism if the legislature seeks to use impeachment against the 
president more than the citizenry thinks appropriate.  The problems raised 
by an underutilized impeachment regime, by contrast, seem more of a threat 
to democratic governance, depending upon the powers granted to the 
president to act independently of the legislature.  Even in a functioning 
democracy, a president, unconstrained by the threat of impeachment, may 
ignore the legal constraints on the office that separate democratic systems 
from authoritarian ones.  A sitting president will have opportunities to use 
the powers of the office improperly, and a president who feels no threat of 
impeachment may abuse those powers to achieve reelection, fundamentally 
undermining the democratic process. 
 
 56.  Cole & Garvey supra note 5. 
 57.  See DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 111(1)2 (S. Kor.) (granting 
the Constitutional Court jurisdiction over impeachment trials). 
 58.  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 273 (1833) 
(“[Impeachment] ought not to be a power so operative and instant, that it may intimidate a modest and 
conscientious statesman, or other functionary from accepting office; nor so weak and torpid, as to be 
capable of lulling offenders into a general security and indifference.”). 
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IV. COMPARING IMPEACHMENT CONTEXTS 
The central purpose of this essay is to facilitate comparison of 
impeachment regimes, rather than merely impeachment law. Impeachment 
regimes being defined to include legal rules, state institutions such as 
legislatures, and background social or political phenomena. The following 
sections address issues that help define the role of impeachment in a society. 
A. Who Can Be Impeached? 
An important vector along which regimes vary is the categories of 
officials subject to impeachment. When asking whether a particular type of 
official should be subject to impeachment, it will be helpful to consider what 
other disciplinary mechanisms might be available instead of, or as a 
supplement to, impeachment. 
Neither the U.S. nor Korea limit impeachment to presidents.  The U.S. 
Constitution allows impeachment of the “President, Vice President and all 
civil Officers of the United States,”59 including federal judges, who “hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour.”60  The Korean Constitution allows 
impeachment of the “President, the Prime Minister, members of the State 
Council, heads of Executive Ministries, judges of the Constitution Court, 
judges, members of the Central Election Management Committee, members 
of the Board of Audit and Inspection, and other public officials designated 
by law.”61  The U.S. approach is typical of the American Constitution in that 
it leaves important terms open to interpretation, while the Korean approach 
is more specific with respect to who can be impeached, and explicitly 
recognizes the possibility of further expansion through legislative action.  
The most interesting contrast between the U.S. and Korean approaches may 
not concern who can be impeached, but rather which institution, the 
legislature or the courts, makes that determination.62 
The U.S. Constitution subjects “civil Officers” to impeachment, which 
means that Congress effectively expands the reach of impeachment 
whenever it creates a new officer position.  The Korean Constitution also 
allows the legislature to expand the list of impeachable officials, but by its 
terms requires statutory designation.63 In the U.S., whether government 
employees are officers, and hence subject to impeachment, is often decided 
 
 59.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 60.  Id. art. III, § 1. 
 61.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 65(1) (S. Kor.). 
 62.  See generally MARIE SEONG-HAK KIM, CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION AND THE TRAVAIL OF 
JUDGES: THE COURTS OF SOUTH KOREA (2019) (recounting a history of judicial deference by South 
Korean courts to the legislature in matters of public policy).  
 63.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 65(1) (S. Kor.). 
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ex post, by the federal courts hearing challenges to actions by those 
employees.64  If it is correct that the federal courts have no power to review 
impeachment decisions, it would seem to follow that an executive branch 
employee who might not qualify as an officer under the Supreme Court’s 
Appointments Clause jurisprudence could be the target of an improper 
impeachment action.65  When the House impeached Senator William Blount 
in 1797, the Senate took the position that the action was inappropriate 
because Senators are not civil officers,66 but the decision that members of the 
legislature are not civil officers does not involve the same analysis as 
deciding whether a member of the executive branch is an officer.67  In a 
future case the House, and possibly the Senate, might be required to decide 
whether an official targeted with impeachment is an officer for purposes of 
the impeachment clause, and while common sense would suggest that they 
would be guided by Supreme Court precedent, without judicial review there 
would be no guarantee that they would be.  A related consequence of the 
U.S. approach is that Congress should not be able to designate by statute that 
an official position will be an officer subject to impeachment unless it has 
also given that position the authority and autonomy required under Lucia and 
the Appointments Clause jurisprudence.  If the federal courts are indeed 
unable to review impeachment decisions, preventing such an overreach by 
Congress could be difficult.68 
 
 64.  Thus, cases determining whether specific U.S. officials are officers subject to impeachment are 
often brought under the Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 
S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018) (finding that SEC administrative law judges are inferior officers, and therefore 
must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause). See generally O.L.C., Officers of the 
United States, supra note 10 (describing the general process by which an office is deemed subject to the 
Appointments Clause and, subsequently, the privileges, protections, and restrictions that come with that 
office). 
 65.  Members of Congress are sworn to uphold the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. Thus, 
they should follow Supreme Court precedent defining officer status under the Constitution. The caselaw 
is not extensive, however, leaving many official positions unaddressed as to whether they are subject to 
impeachment, and the cases tend to involve fact-specific inquiries into the exact powers Congress has 
given to the official in question. See, e.g., Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051–55 (elaborating on the Germaine and 
Buckley common law tests as a means through which the Court can determine whether individuals are 
“Officers of the United States”).  
 66.  ALEX SIMPSON, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS 191–92 (1916). 
 67.  Lucia and the Appointments Clause cases that precede it focus on the powers given to specific 
officials to exercise the authority of the federal government, and to what extent their exercises of that 
authority are subject to review by superiors. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049. Individual members of 
Congress do not enjoy such powers, so the Lucia analysis would not be applicable. 
 68.  The House has only used its authority to impeach officers below the President once; to deal 
with the corrupt Secretary of War William W. Belknap. KYVIG, supra note 11, at 30. Thus, its incentives 
with respect to creating officer positions are likely not guided by impeachability concerns. It is important 
to analyze the potentialities within impeachment regimes, however, because attitudes and behaviors can 
change. 
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Turning to impeachment of judges, judicial independence is widely 
recognized as fundamental to the Rule of Law.69 Judges therefore must enjoy 
substantial job protection, not only from the executive and legislative 
branches, whom they must sometimes rule against, but also from the 
judiciary itself, as an organization.70  However, the benefits of judicial 
independence do not completely outweigh concerns about corruption or 
incompetence, so judges’ job protection cannot be unlimited.71  Using the 
U.S. and Korean judiciaries to evaluate impeachment and judicial 
independence is appropriate because the U.S. judiciary is very thinly 
bureaucratized,72 while the Korean judiciary is highly bureaucratized, 
following Japanese and German practices.73  Bureaucratic organization 
facilitates discipline of judges by the judiciary, which might make judicial 
impeachment less necessary, but Korea also allows for judicial 
impeachment, even though its judges are appointed for fixed rather than 
lifetime terms.74  In addition to impeachment, the Korean Constitution allows 
for both criminal punishment and disciplinary action through the judicial 
bureaucracy,75 while the U.S. relies primarily on prosecution and 
 
 69.  NORMAN S. MARSH, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY: A 
REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JURISTS, NEW DELHI, INDIA 279 (1959) (remarking that 
the rule of law is one of the fundamental attributes of a free society, but simultaneously noting that judges 
need not be absolutely independent from the legislature so long as the judge “observe[s] the law and the 
assumptions which underlie it, in the light of his own conscience, to the best of his abilities.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 70.  Judicial freedom from external pressures is necessary but not sufficient for the Rule of Law to 
function. Also necessary is that the judges use the insulation they enjoy to adjudicate according to the 
law, rather than indulging their personal preferences. 
 71.  MARSH, supra note 69, at 279–80. 
 72.  Bureaucratized here means organized on a hierarchical, civil service model, in which judges 
generally begin their careers at the bottom of a single, pyramid-shaped bureaucracy through which they 
hope to rise over their careers. In bureaucratized judiciaries, judges are promoted to higher courts as they 
move up the bureaucracy, and the entire organization is controlled from the top. Judiciaries in the U.S., 
state and federal, are divided into different levels for purposes of appeals, and supreme courts play some 
role in organizing the courts beneath them, but the judiciaries themselves are not organized bureaucracies. 
See Patricia M. Wald, Commentary, Bureaucracy and the Courts, 92 YALE L.J 1478, 1479 (“[T]he courts 
hardly operate as a bureaucratic hierarchy. Vertically-district to circuit, circuit to Supreme Court-the 
federal judiciary does not function in the hierarchical fashion of a typical bureaucracy.”).  
 73.  On the history of the Korean judiciary, see generally DAE-KYU YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 134, 149 (1990) (discussing the development of judicial independence 
through “the adoption of the Western democratic form of government” and judicial review within South 
Korea, while emphasizing the importance of political conditions on the judiciary’s independence and 
review process); KIM, supra note 62 (highlighting the modern historical development of the Korean 
judiciary from the end of the Second World War to the present, and emphasizing the important influences 
Japanese and German legal traditions have had on the Korean judicial model). 
 74.  The Korean Constitution provides that justices of the Supreme Court enjoy six-year terms, 
while ordinary judges enjoy ten-year terms. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 
105 (S. Kor.). 
 75.  “No judge shall be removed from office except by impeachment or a sentence of imprisonment 
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impeachment for serious judicial misconduct, supplemented by 
investigations of judges below the Supreme Court under the Judicial 
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.76  In the 
U.S., impeachment has been used against judges far more often than against 
other officers.77 
In terms of over versus under-inclusion, the goal with respect to judges 
is that impeachment should be a rigorous yet smooth process when evidence 
of serious misconduct exists, but unavailable as a tool to punish unpopular 
judicial decisions.  Neither Korea nor the U.S. have specific standards for 
judicial impeachments,78 but in neither country does it seem likely that 
overuse of judicial impeachment threatens judicial independence.  In Korea, 
this is suggested by the legal structure, in which the Constitutional Court 
adjudicates impeachments, and would seem unlikely to allow impeachment 
to endanger judicial independence so long as Korea remains a democracy.  
The more likely threat to judicial independence arises from the bureaucratic 
nature of Korea’s judiciary, which allows those at the top to exert substantial 
influence over the career paths of those below.79  In the U.S. there have been 
efforts to impeach judges on grounds best understood as political—for 
example, the effort to impeach Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1805, 
and Justices Earl Warren and William O. Douglas in the middle of the 
twentieth century.80 However, only the Chase effort made it as far as the 
 
or heavier punishment, nor shall he be suspended from office, have his salary reduced or suffer any other 
unfavorable treatment except by disciplinary action.” Id. art. 106. “The Supreme Court may establish, 
within the scope of law, regulations pertaining to judicial proceedings and internal discipline and 
regulations on administrative matters of the court.” Id. art. 108. 
 76.  28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64. For information on administration of the Act, see Judicial Conduct & 
Disability, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-conduct-disability [https:// 
perma.cc/2EWQ-LDAY] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021). 
 77.  See KYVIG, supra note 11, at 395. 
 78.  The Impeachment Clause does not specifically mention judges among those who can be 
impeached, but U.S. practice is that the judges are subject to the process. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Article 
III, Section 1 states that judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.” Id. art. III, § 1. This 
suggests the possibility of a different standard for removal than “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors,” but it has generally not been interpreted as setting a different standard for their 
removal through impeachment. Id. art. II, §4; see CHARLES W. JOHNSON ET AL., U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES, PRECEDENTS AND PROCEDURES OF THE 
HOUSE 608–13 (2017) (“The more modern view . . . is that the ‘‘good Behaviour’’ clause more aptly 
describes judicial tenure; that is, the clause . . . merely means that Federal judges hold office for life unless 
they are removed under some other provision of the Constitution. Under this view, the power of removal 
together with the appropriate standard are contained solely in the impeachment clause.”). For an extended 
discussion of judicial impeachments, including an argument that the standards should be different, see 
BERGER, supra note 36, at 127–88. 
 79.  See YOON, supra note 73, at 120–22. 
 80.  KYVIG, supra note 11, at 1, 52, 106. 
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Senate, where it was defeated.81  The vast majority of other judicial 
impeachments in the U.S. have involved clear misconduct rather than 
political differences.82  Although in comparison to South Korea’s, the U.S. 
system may seem more susceptible to political abuse, that is unlikely to 
occur.  So long as the two main political parties remain roughly balanced, 
the two-thirds supermajority requirement for conviction in the Senate should 
provide sufficient protection against judicial impeachments on political 
grounds. 
Impeachment could also extend to members of the legislative branch.  
Legislators, too, need to be subject to removal for misbehavior, and in 
principle there is no reason impeachment could not provide one such 
method.83  The Korean Constitution leaves open impeachment of “other 
public officials designated by Act,” and the National Assembly could enact 
the necessary statute allowing its members to be impeached, assuming they 
qualify as public officials.  However, the Korean Constitution allows the 
National Assembly to discipline and expel its own members,84 so unless the 
National Assembly saw a concrete benefit to involving the Constitutional 
Court in disciplining National Assembly members, which impeachment 
would do, it is not clear why that body would enact the required statute. 
Given the relevant Constitutional text, impeaching a U.S. legislator 
would require that legislators be “civil Officers of the United States,” a 
problematic view despite the fact that the Constitution leaves “civil Officer” 
undefined.  The Constitution speaks of officers and members of Congress as 
two distinct groups, suggesting that members of Congress are not officers.  
For example, in its requirement that “no Person holding any Office under the 
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in 
Office.”85 If members of Congress were officers, and thus subject to 
 
 81.  Valerie Strauss, Can a Supreme Court Justice Be Forcibly Removed from the Bench? A Quick 
Civics Lesson, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015, 11:27 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2015/12/12/can-a-supreme-court-justice-be-forcibly-removed-from-the-bench-a-quick-civics-
lesson/ [https://perma.cc/3NFK-FM86]. 
 82.  See, e.g., KYVIG, supra note 11, at 9–34 (providing accounts of several historical judicial 
impeachments involving misconduct). 
 83.  Raoul Berger’s important study of the U.S. system includes an extended argument for why 
impeachment should be available against members of Congress. See BERGER, supra note 36, at 224–33. 
Berger’s argument draws heavily on the English example, in which the House of Commons used 
impeachment against members of the House of Lords. Id. 
 84.  “The National Assembly may review the qualifications of its members and may take 
disciplinary actions against [them]. . . . The concurrent vote of two thirds or more of the total members 
of the National Assembly shall be required for the expulsion of any member.” DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB 
[HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 64(2)–(3) (S. Kor.). 
 85.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
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impeachment, that requirement would be redundant.86  Furthermore, like 
Korea’s National Assembly, the House and the Senate have the authority 
under the Constitution to expel their members on their own authority, 
without the involvement of the other house.87  That suggests that the 
Constitution’s drafters did not envision impeachment being used to remove 
members of the legislature, since an easier path was available.  It is also well 
established that members of Congress are not immune from the ordinary 
criminal process simply as a function of holding office,88 further reducing 
the need to have impeachment apply to them. 
As noted above, impeachment of a legislator was attempted once in the 
early history of the U.S., when the House voted in 1797 to impeach Senator 
William Blount for corrupt and possibly treasonous dealings with Great 
Britain.89  The Senate had already expelled Blount using its own 
Constitutional authority under Article I, Section 5, so the only practical effect 
of the House voting to impeach was that the Senate could impose the 
additional punishment of barring Blount from again holding high federal 
office.  The Senate refused to act on the case, influenced by the fact that 
Blount was no longer in office, and thus arguably no longer subject to 
impeachment, and based on concerns that impeachment should not be 
available against legislators.90 
B. Impeachment in Relation to the Criminal and Civil Justice Systems 
In addition to addressing who may be impeached, countries must also 
address how their impeachment regimes interact with their ordinary civil and 
criminal justice systems.  The issues are related, in part, because 
impeachment and the ordinary justice system, together with internal 
bureaucratic discipline, are the typical ways to discipline officials.  If one is 
unavailable, it becomes important that others be available.  For example, in 
terms of sanctioning wayward presidents, if impeachment is not available, 
the bad actors will not be subject to discipline by a bureaucracy, which makes 
it crucial that the ordinary justice system be able to reach them.  As discussed 
above, judges who misbehave may be subject to sanction by the judicial 
 
 86.  Cf. BERGER, supra note 36, at 224–33 (recounting the historical developments that led to 
legislators being exempt from impeachment on the grounds that they are not “civil officers,” but also 
criticizing this distinction).  
 87.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may . . . punish its Members for disorderly 
Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”). 
 88.  A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 
235 (2000) [hereinafter O.L.C., President’s Amenability to Indictment]. 
 89.  KYVIG, supra note 11, at 22; BERGER, supra note 36, at 214. 
 90.  KYVIG, supra note 11, at 22. 
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bureaucracy itself,91 lower executive branch officers may be subject to 
discipline by the president for misconduct even if not impeached or 
criminally prosecuted, and legislators may be subject to sanction and 
ultimately expulsion by the bodies in which they serve.  Because presidents 
are not subject to these intra-branch sources of discipline, an important issue 
is how presidential impeachment relates to the criminal process,92 though the 
civil justice system may be important as well. Two commonly discussed 
questions involve the effects of impeachment, if it occurs, and whether 
impeachment is the exclusive available means of sanction. 
In setting the relationship between presidential impeachment and the 
ordinary criminal process, the Korean Constitution adopts one of the obvious 
options, stipulating: “The President shall not be charged with a criminal 
offense during his tenure of office except for insurrection or treason.”93  This 
immunity would seem to apply to acts committed either before or during the 
presidency, but also to clearly end upon removal from office through 
impeachment,94 thus providing a demarcation between the impeachment and 
criminal processes.  The Korean Constitution does not address what steps 
might be taken to investigate a sitting president short of indictment, but prior 
to impeachment proceedings in the National Assembly, Korean prosecutors 
did officially identify President Park as a suspect and possible accomplice in 
their criminal investigation of her associate, Soon-sil Choi.95 
The U.S. Constitution is less clear than the Korean Constitution in 
demarcating impeachment from criminal justice, providing only that “the 
Party convicted [by the Senate] shall nevertheless be liable and subject to 
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”96 The text 
does not clearly indicate that the criminal process is unavailable until the 
person is removed by impeachment, only that impeachment and criminal 
 
 91.  See, e.g., DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 106(1) (S. Kor.) 
(referencing the possibility of judicial discipline short of impeachment or criminal punishment, including 
suspension and salary reduction). 
 92.  In the U.S. it is clearly established that judges, legislators, and executive branch officials below 
the President may be prosecuted while in office. O.L.C., President’s Amenability to Indictment, supra 
note 88, at 234–35. 
 93.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 84 (S. Kor.). 
 94.  Id. art. 65(4) (“A decision on impeachment shall not extend further than removal from public 
office. However, it shall not exempt the person impeached from civil or criminal liability.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 95.  Sang-Hun, South Korea’s Impeachment Process, supra note 23; Choe Sang-Hun, Park Geun-
hye Was Accomplice in Extortion, South Korean Prosecutors Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/asia/park-geun-hye-south-korea-extortion-accomplice-
prosecutors.html [https://perma.cc/9N7T-C46B]. 
 96.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
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liability are not mutually exclusive.97 The consensus position in the U.S., 
similar to in Korea, is that while a sitting president is not considered 
completely immune from the criminal process, he or she may not be indicted 
or prosecuted while in office.98 The President can be investigated for 
violations of federal law by specially-designated prosecutors, such as 
“special counsel” Robert Mueller,99 and the Supreme Court recently held that 
President Trump could not block a state grand jury subpoena duces tecum 
seeking financial documents, from before Trump took office, from his 
accounting firm.100 Although having access to special counsel investigation 
 
 97.  See O.L.C., President’s Amenability to Indictment, supra note 88, at 255 (“Recognizing an 
immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution once the 
President’s term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or impeachment.”). 
 98.  Id. at 260; Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, A Sitting President Can’t Be Prosecuted: Alexander 
Hamilton Helps Clarify the Constitutional Remedy, BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2017, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-31/a-sitting-president-can-t-be-prosecuted [https:// 
perma.cc/PTZ8-D3C5]; see also ANDREW COAN, PROSECUTING THE PRESIDENT: HOW SPECIAL 
PROSECUTORS HOLD PRESIDENTS ACCOUNTABLE AND PROTECT THE RULE OF LAW 111–30 (2019). But 
see Ronald Rotunda, Opinion, The President Can Be Indicted—Just Not by Mueller, WASH. POST (July 
27, 2017, 7:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-president-can-be-indicted-just-not-
by-mueller/2017/07/27/a597b922-721d-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html [https://perma.cc/749T-
WQB3] (arguing that a sitting president could be indicted, but also discussing the Department of Justice’s 
position to the contrary); Jonathan Turley, Can Donald Trump Be Indicted While Serving as President?, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/ 
2018/02/27/can-donald-trump-be-indicted-while-serving-as-president/ [https://perma.cc/8VL7-YMSV]. 
In this view, the function of the constitutional text in question is to make clear that criminal prosecution 
after impeachment will not constitute prohibited double jeopardy. O.L.C., President’s Amenability to 
Indictment, supra note 88, at 222 (citing to Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, on Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil Officers 
to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office (Sept. 24, 1973) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Justice)). 
 99.  The current authority for the position of special counsels such as Mr. Mueller is found in 28 
C.F.R. pt. 600 (2021), adopted by the Department of Justice to implement sections of the U.S. Code. For 
a lucid explanation of Mueller’s status in relation to the President, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Opinion, The 
Easy Path to Firing Mueller, REG. REV. (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/ 
2018/04/16/pierce-path-firing-mueller/ [https://perma.cc/43ZX-Q2VP] (explaining that the Attorney 
General can fire the special counsel for “good cause,” and that the President can fire the Attorney 
General). The former independent counsel statute required independent counsels such as Ken Starr, who 
investigated President Clinton, to provide reports to Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h); Interview by Barak 
Goodman with Kenneth Starr, available at https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/ 
features/clinton-interview-kenneth-starr/ [https://perma. cc/G5V9-EY9N] (last visited Mar. 29, 2021). 
The Justice Department’s current special counsel regulations do not require this, and Attorney General 
William Barr gave Congress a redacted version of Mueller’s report, while the Trump Administration and 
Congress sparred over other materials produced during the investigation. See David B. Rivkin Jr. & 
Elizabeth Price Foley, Opinion, Congress Can’t Outsource Impeachment, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2019, 
6:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-cant-outsource-impeachment-11559341259 [https:// 
perma.cc/2L4D-DFGP] (arguing that Democrats could not use Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s probe 
to oust then-President Trump because doing so would violate separation of powers principles inherent in 
the American constitution). 
 100.  Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020). Importantly, the President’s lawyers conceded 
that he is not immune from a state criminal investigation while in office. Id. at 2426–27. The nature of 
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materials may provide valuable assistance to Congress in its impeachment 
decision making, there are strong arguments in favor of the U.S. following 
the mandated Korean solution of impeachment first, then prosecution. As 
noted in the OLC opinion cited above, statutes of limitations can be tolled 
during a president’s tenure in order to preserve the possibility of post-
presidency prosecution, and because defending against a criminal 
prosecution could substantially distract a sitting president from carrying out 
her constitutional duties.101 
Historically, there has been less focus in the U.S. on the relationship 
between the civil justice system and impeachment. But the decision by the 
Supreme Court in Clinton v. Jones,102 reversing the District Court, in part, 
and allowing Paula Jones’ sexual harassment suit against Bill Clinton to 
proceed while he was President, was key to how that impeachment unfolded. 
The case has also opened the door to claims against Trump for pre-
Presidential conduct.103 The District court initially ruled that President 
Clinton was immune from civil suit while in office, but allowed discovery, 
including the deposing of the President himself, to proceed while the 
presidential immunity issue was being appealed.104 This resulted in President 
Clinton being deposed about his relationship with Monika Lewinsky, and 
while under oath, he made statements about that relationship that arguably 
constituted the crime of perjury, substantially strengthening arguments for 
his impeachment.105 Given that precedent, President Trump’s controversial 
past, and the extreme hostility toward him, it seems possible that the U.S. 
will have to work through these issues again if he wins reelection in 
November. Civil suits have been filed against him based on pre-election 
alleged conduct,106 and the President’s foes may hope to corner him into 
repeating Clinton’s mistakes of lying under oath or otherwise obstructing the 
judicial process. Many Republicans argued that Clinton’s lies under oath 
justified his impeachment, despite objections that lying about extra-marital 
 
U.S. federalism, with criminal law at both the state and the federal level, adds a level of complexity to 
this area that unitary systems like South Korea avoid. 
 101.  O.L.C., President’s Amenability to Indictment, supra note 88, at 222, 256. 
 102.  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707–08 (1997). 
 103.  Anna North, The Summer Zervos Sexual Assault Allegations and Lawsuit Against Donald 
Trump, Explained, VOX (Mar. 14, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/ 
3/26/17151766/trump-lawsuit-summer-zervos-apprentice [https://perma.cc/F836-WCWE].  
 104.  Clinton, 520 U.S. at 687. 
 105.  POSNER, supra note 13, at 44–46. The two articles of impeachment adopted by the House were 
perjury and obstruction of justice, both arising out of the President’s attempts to conceal his relationship 
with Lewinsky. Id. at 1.  
 106.  Jennifer Peltz, AP Exclusive: Woman Who Says Trump Raped Her Seeks His DNA, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Jan. 30, 2020), https://apnews.com/0475983f6c1e40628d2a3058e270a747 [https:// 
perma.cc/M3C7-5KE8]; North, supra note 103. 
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affairs, even in a federal court deposition, should not be considered an 
impeachable offense.107 Especially if Democrats control both the House and 
the Senate after the 2020 elections, we could see the parties trade places on 
the issue. The better policy would probably be to stay civil litigation against 
a president until his or her term is over, as the District Court would have 
done in Paula Jones’ suit against President Clinton,108 but the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Clinton v. Jones denying such temporary immunity could 
be hard for a judge hearing a case against Trump to avoid. The Korean 
Constitution is also silent on the relationship between the civil justice system 
and impeachment, and the Korean courts have had less need than U.S. courts 
to rule on the issues that can arise. At least two group tort actions were 
brought against President Park based on actions she took while in office, one 
in January 2017, after she had been impeached by the National Assembly 
but before she was removed by the Constitutional Court,109 and one brought 
in June, 2017, after she had been removed.110 Both were dismissed at the trial 
court level,111 and the dismissal of the first suit has been upheld on appeal by 
the Seoul High Court.112 The suits were by large groups of citizens, each 
claiming small amounts for emotional damage due to Park’s alleged 
misbehavior, and neither played a role in her impeachment. This suggests 
that civil litigation may become a regular part of the impeachment regime in 
Korea, as it now seems to be in the U.S., but so far that has not been the case. 
C. Impeachment for Official vs. Non-Official Conduct 
Impeachment regimes must also face the issue of whether impeachment 
should be available for conduct that did not occur during the performance of 
official duties.113  The argument for impeaching only on the basis of actions 
 
 107.  POSNER, supra note 13, at 207–08. 
 108.  Clinton, 520 U.S. at 687. 
 109.  Court Dismisses Citizens’ Damage Suit Against Former President Park, YONHAP NEWS 
AGENCY (May 23, 2019, 5:08 PM) [hereinafter Court Dismisses Citizens’ Damage Suit], 
http://yna.kr/AEN20190523007200315 [https://perma.cc/S76T-KU8R]; Anna Fifield, South Korean 




 110.  Court Rejects Second Damage Suit Against Former President Park, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY 
(Dec. 13, 2019, 1:54 PM), http://yna.kr/AEN20191213004400315 [https://perma.cc/Q5NP-WSGQ]. 
 111.  Id.; Court Dismisses Citizens’ Damage Suit, supra note 109. 
 112.  Appellate Court Rejects Citizens’ Damage Suit Against Ousted Ex-President, YONHAP NEWS 
AGENCY (June 18, 2020, 5:26 PM), http://yna.kr/AEN20200618009800315 [https://perma.cc/J73P-
YHW3]. 
 113.  Objectionable conduct could occur at three different points in time: before taking office, while 
in office but not while performing official duties, and while in office and during the performance of 
official duties. 
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taken in office makes sense if one sees impeachable officers as having 
separate public and private lives recognized and protected by the legal 
system. An ordinary public servant might be prohibited from engaging in 
certain activities at work, for example, but be free to engage in the same 
activities while off duty, or before taking the government position. Another 
approach could be that offenses could constitute grounds for dismissal if 
committed during job tenure, even if in a personal capacity, but not if 
committed before taking office. An impeachment regime could operate this 
way, establishing a structure for distinguishing among the many possible fact 
patterns that could arise, or could go to the opposite extreme of recognizing 
no distinction between being in or out of office, or between being on and 
being off duty. Officials in such an impeachment regime would be something 
like strictly at-will private employees, who may be dismissed for present or 
past conduct, whether on or off duty. 
These issues are not directly addressed in the U.S. Constitution, either 
in the grounds for impeachment, or in other sections addressing the 
impeachment process. But these issues do come up in discussions of how the 
U.S. impeachment system should operate,114 and while it is typical to argue 
that limiting impeachment to acts committed during the performance of 
official duties would cause the regime to be underinclusive, that position 
must be combined with some kind of limiting principle to avoid over-
inclusion. The search for limiting principles can involve line drawing in 
terms of seriousness, time passed, or both. For example, in the American 
impeachment discourse, one could reasonably argue that minor misbehavior 
long before taking office definitely should not constitute grounds for 
impeachment, though both “minor” and “long before” are terms that could 
quickly become contested in any actual case. One need only think of the 
hostile behavior toward women that Donald Trump allegedly engaged in 
prior to his presidency to see the difficulty of applying this seemingly 
common-sense limiting principle in the heat of an actual impeachment 
discussion. With respect to bad acts while in office but not involving official 
duties, an argument offered against the Clinton impeachment was that his 
perjury occurred in a lawsuit arising out of private rather than official 
conduct,115 but that argument was also based on a view that his bad acts were 
 
 114.  See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 36, at 202–23 (discussing impeachment in a historical context 
and instances where it was used to remove of judges for misbehavior); POSNER, supra note 13, at 104–
05, 171–73. 
 115.  KYVIG, supra note 11, at 394; Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 90 (1998) [hereinafter 
Background and History of Impeachment] (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Karl N. Llewellyn 
Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago School of Law) (“[A] false 
statement under oath is an appropriate basis for impeachment if and only if the false statement involved 
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not that serious.116 Very bad acts, of which murder is a typical example, are 
often discussed as grounds for impeachment when committed.117 
The Korean Constitution again opted for clarity by stipulating that 
officials may be impeached for offenses committed “in the performance of 
official duties.”118  The issue came up in the impeachment of President Noh, 
because the National Assembly had charged him with corruption for illegal 
activities during his presidential campaign.  The Constitutional Court 
dismissed those claims for being based on conduct that did not take place in 
the performance of official duties.119  While on these issues the U.S. 
approach raises the danger of over-inclusion, the Korean position raises the 
danger of under-inclusion. Because the Korean Constitution stipulates that a 
president is immune from criminal prosecution while in office,120 if the 
applicable statute of limitations could not be tolled, a president who 
committed serious misconduct prior to taking office could escape both 
impeachment and prosecution.  The preference in the Korean Constitution 
for clarity thus could come at the cost of effective accountability. 
D. Consequences of Impeachment 
The goal of an impeachment effort is typically thought to be removal 
from office, but the consequences need not be so limited. Therefore, it is 
worth comparing different approaches.  In England, the main inspiration for 
the U.S. impeachment system, the House of Commons originally used 
impeachment to seek several sorts of criminal punishment, including “fines, 
property forfeiture, disqualification from future officeholding, 
imprisonment, or even execution,” in addition to removal from office.121  
Under the U.S. Constitution, impeachment “shall” result in removal from 
office, but the Senate also has the choice to impose “disqualification to hold 
and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.”122  If 
the Senate decides to add disqualification to removal from office, a separate 
 
conduct that by itself raises serious questions about abuse of office.”) (emphasis added). 
 116.  Background and History of Impeachment, supra note 115, at 101 (statement of Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., Professor of History, Harvard University of Law) (“[L]ying about one’s sex life is not a 
monstrous crime. . . . Gentlemen always lie about their sex lives.”). 
 117.  POSNER, supra note 13, at 241 (referring to this as the “public acts + murder” approach to 
limiting impeachment’s reach). 
 118.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 65(1) (S. Kor.). 
 119.  Lee, supra note 15, at 420. 
 120.  See DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 65(1) (S. Kor.). 
 121.  KYVIG, supra note 11, at 12. 
 122.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. Raoul Berger cites this possibility of future disqualification, 
beyond simple removal from office, in support of his argument that impeachment should be available 
against Senators. BERGER, supra note 36, at 225. 
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vote requiring only an ordinary majority is done, not the two-thirds 
supermajority required for expulsion.123  The Korean Constitution adopts the 
less complicated alternative that the Constitutional Court’s action in an 
impeachment can extend no further than removal from office.124  While the 
Korean approach is again less complex than the U.S., the additional sanction 
available to the Senate, though rarely used by that body,125 could be useful 
under certain circumstances.  The fact that the Senate did not also disqualify 
impeached Judge Alcee Hastings from later holding high office allowed him 
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives, which he won in 1992,126 
and still holds.  The voters who elected Hastings afforded him a second 
chance at high office, and because the appointments of judges and principal 
officers in the executive branch must receive Senate confirmation, winning 
elected office, as Hastings did, would be the most likely path for an 
impeached official to regain high office.127  It may have been awkward for 
Hastings to assume a seat in the body that impeached him, but it would be 
hard to argue that his doing so seriously damaged the American political 
system.  It is not hard to imagine a political system in which it could be 
harmful for impeached officials to be able to return to high office, however, 
especially for impeached presidents to run again for that office.128  If that 
were the case, the optimal impeachment regime might follow neither the 
Korean nor the U.S. approach, but instead make the ban automatic with 
removal. 
Another issue related to the consequences of impeachment is how the 
removed official will be replaced, especially when that official is the head of 
 
 123.  See KYVIG, supra note 11, at 31 (discussing how the Senate’s simple majority vote was 
sufficient to disqualify Court of Appeals Judge Robert W. Archbald from holding future office); 
GERHARDT, supra note 36, at 60. 
 124.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 65(4) (S. Kor.). 
 125.  As of 1996 the Senate had imposed disqualification twice, in the cases of federal judges 
Archbald and Humphreys. See GERHARDT, supra note 36, at 60. 
 126.  Id. at 60–62. 
 127.  The Senate being the body that had convicted and removed that official in the impeachment. 
Id. 
 128.  Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff was impeached and removed from office in 2016. Brazil’s 
Former Leader Rousseff Fails in Bid for Senate Seat, EYEWITNESS NEWS [hereinafter Rousseff Fails in 
Bid for Senate Seat], https://ewn.co.za/2018/10/08/brazil-s-former-leader-rousseff-fails-in-bid-for-
senate-seat [https://perma.cc/5PFD-UY3C] (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). Despite the fact that Brazil’s 
Constitution bars impeached presidents from again holding public office, the Chief Justice of Brazil’s 
Supreme Court ordered the Senate to hold a separate vote on whether to ban Rousseff from office for 
eight years, and imposed a two-thirds supermajority requirement. Matt Sandy, Dilma Rousseff’s 
Impeachment is the Start of Brazil’s Crisis–Not the End, TIME (Sept. 1, 2016, 2:29 PM), 
https://time.com/4476011/brazil-dilma-rousseff-crisis-impeachment/ [https://perma.cc/9BK4-DLF5]. 
That vote failed, leaving Rousseff free to seek office again. Rousseff ran unsuccessfully for a seat in the 
Brazilian Senate in 2018. Rousseff Fails in Bid for Senate Seat, supra note 128. 
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state.  When a Korean president is impeached and removed by the 
Constitutional Court, a new presidential election is held within sixty days 
from the date of the removal.129  This approach raises the possibility that 
impeachment will result in a shift in party control of the presidency, which 
happened in 2017 when left-leaning Moon Jae-In was elected to replace 
conservative Park Gun-Hye after she was impeached and removed.130  If one 
believes that impeachment efforts are unlikely to succeed absent a supportive 
electorate, it may seem reasonable that Korea’s rule afforded liberal forces 
the opportunity to maintain their political momentum by trying to elect 
President Park’s replacement in the election that immediately followed. 
In the U.S., by contrast, an impeached president is simply replaced by 
the vice president, who serves out the remainder of the former president’s 
term.131 This creates political dynamics quite different from those in Korea, 
and would be included in calculations by pro and anti-impeachment forces.  
During the impeachment effort against President Andrew Johnson, some 
Republican senators reportedly voted against removal because they were 
concerned about the consequences of their more radical Republican 
colleague, Benjamin Wade, taking Johnson’s place.132  In the same vein, 
historian David Kyvig argues that sentiment to impeach Richard Nixon was 
tempered when the widely-disliked Spiro Agnew was his vice president, and 
that the fact that generally-respected Gerald Ford replaced Agnew made 
Nixon’s impeachment more likely.133  Kyvig argues that in the Clinton 
impeachment, the fact that Al Gore was reasonably popular meant that he 
functioned more like Ford than like Agnew; he did not provide protection 
against impeachment for Clinton by being more objectionable himself.134  
The Clinton-Gore pairing raises another important consequence of the U.S. 
system. The vice president who succeeds an impeached president may be a 
strong candidate in the next presidential election.  If the Senate had convicted 
Bill Clinton in 1998, in all probability Gore would have run for president 
 
 129.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 68(2) (S. Kor.).  
 130.  Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Elects Moon Jae-in, Who Backs Talks with North, as President, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/world/asia/south-korea-election-
president-moon-jae-in.html [https://perma.cc/G9RL-2UB2]. 
 131.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1. 
 132.  KYVIG, supra note 11, at 28–29. Johnson had no vice president, and at that time the President 
pro tempore of the Senate, Wade’s position, was next in line to the presidency. The Man Whose 
Impeachment Vote Saved Andrew Johnson, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (May 16, 2020), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-man-whose-impeachment-vote-saved-andrew-johnson [https:// 
perma.cc/ES5J-BG29]. 
 133.  KYVIG, supra note 11, at 399–400 (describing that a vice president who is generally disliked 
and viewed as “an unpalatable alternative to the president” may serve as a barrier towards the 
consideration of impeaching the sitting president, and is known as the “Agnew-Ford factor”). 
 134.  Id. at 400. 
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against George W. Bush in 2000, and would have done so from the 
advantageous position of being the incumbent. Kyvig argues that Gore 
probably would have defeated Bush in 2000, and if Clinton’s removal had 
come late enough in the presidential term, then Gore might have been able 
to run for President again in 2004, entirely displacing the Bush presidency.135  
This suggests that Republicans trying to impeach Clinton should have been 
careful about what they were seeking, but it also seems true that Democrats 
might have benefitted from a Clinton impeachment as compared to what 
history actually gave them, which was Bush defeating Gore in 2000. 
Extending this analysis to the Trump impeachment effort, it seems 
unlikely that Vice President Pence served as a shield for Trump the way 
Agnew’s personal flaws may have protected Nixon.  With respect to the 
possible political effects of a successful Trump impeachment, there was 
concern among Trump opponents that a President Pence, running as the 
incumbent in 2020, might be difficult for Democrats to defeat.136  By the 
same token, if Joe Biden had defeated Trump in the 2020 election, 
Republicans might have regretted blocking conviction of Trump in the 
Senate. 
Comparing the Korean and U.S. approaches to replacing an impeached 
president, the Korean model would seem to encourage impeachment efforts 
because the broad political groundswell necessary to bring about a successful 
impeachment could be expected to lead to victory in a subsequent 
replacement election, as happened in 2017.  This should be encouraging to 
Korean politicians who think they might have the votes to push through an 
impeachment action in the National Assembly.  Under the U.S. system, by 
contrast, the propensity to impeach presidents should be reduced by the fact 
that the results of a successful impeachment are less predictably positive for 
the party that spearheads the effort.  The party that leads a successful 
presidential impeachment may hurt itself in the long term if the vice 
president who steps in becomes a strong contender in the next presidential 
election.  The Democratic Party was able to take back the White House with 
Jimmy Carter’s victory in the 1976 election, after having lead the 
impeachment effort that forced Nixon to resign in 1974, so there is no 
guarantee that a successful impeachment effort will backfire against the party 
that leads it.  The danger of a successful impeachment backfiring certainly 
 
 135.  See id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1, allowing a person who becomes President 
through a replacement process and serves two years or less, to run for two additional terms as President).  
 136.  See Bill Scher, How President Pence Would Blow Up 2020, POLITICO (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/02/pence-trump-president-2020-228903 [https://per 
ma.cc/N7G9-7GBH].  
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seems higher in the U.S. than in Korea, however, which should have an effect 
on political calculations. 
V. IMPEACHMENT PROPER 
The factors discussed above are important for comparing impeachment 
regimes because they help determine when and how impeachment will be 
used, and its effects.  To provide a more full comparison of impeachment 
regimes, however, it is also necessary to compare internal aspects of 
impeachment, such as the substantive standards, structures, and procedures 
that govern the process. 
A. Impeachment Standards 
The most obvious internal standard is the substantive grounds for 
impeachment, the impeachable offense, which has already been discussed at 
length.137  Ideally there would also be a clear evidentiary standard that would 
have to be met with respect to each alleged offense, in both the prosecuting 
and adjudicating body.  Neither the Korean nor the U.S. constitution 
addresses these concerns,138 however, and in the U.S., where judicial review 
of impeachment decisions is considered unavailable, it is hard to see how 
evidentiary requirements could be enforced.  That does not mean that putting 
evidentiary standards in the law would be meaningless, however, because 
like the definition of impeachable offense, an articulated evidentiary 
standard might influence legislators’ decisions, even if it didn’t fully 
constrain them.  Evidentiary standards might also be used by the electorate, 
when its turn came to render its verdict. 
The Korean system, in which the Constitutional Court sits as the 
adjudicating body, would seem much more capable of implementing 
evidentiary standards because that body is not simply a group of 
politicians.139  Assuming that courts are likely to be more constrained by 
evidentiary standards than legislative bodies are, in a system like Korea’s, 
stipulated burdens of proof could be used to help ensure that impeachments 
are successful only when evidence of guilt is truly substantial.  Korea’s 
Constitutional Court has taken a judicial approach to its role in adjudicating 
 
 137.  See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 138.  See GERHARDT, supra note 36, at 40–42, 112–13 (discussing the debate about adopting uniform 
rules of evidence and standard of proof in the Senate for impeachment trials); POSNER, supra note 13, at 
120–21 (discussing the lack of a clear standard of proof in both the House and the Senate); Michael C. 
Dorf, The Articles of Impeachment, the Burden of Proof, and Propensity Evidence, DORF ON L. (Dec. 11, 
2019), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2019/12/the-articles-of-impeachment-burden-of.html [https://perma 
.cc/H7WM-54V9]. 
 139.  This assumption seems fair, even recognizing that judges are to some extent political actors and 
that legislators may well be trained as lawyers.  
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impeachments, and in one scholar’s view, “one of the consequences . . . is 
judicial development of a body of law that defines the terms of debate on the 
proper use of the impeachment device and binds future generations 
accordingly.”140 
B. Voting Requirements: Quorum and Voting 
Another set of issues crucial to impeachment regimes involves voting 
in the charging and the adjudicating bodies, in which both quorum and voting 
requirements potentially matter.  The U.S. Constitution opted for the 
standard quorum requirement for impeachment votes in both the House and 
the Senate—a simple majority.141  Because the Constitution does not impose 
a supermajority requirement on impeachment voting in the House, allowing 
instead impeachment by a simple majority,142 the House could impeach on a 
low threshold, a simple majority vote of the simple majority necessary for a 
quorum.  It is unlikely that members of the House would not attend an 
impeachment vote, however, so practically speaking the required vote is 
likely to be close to a majority of the full House membership.  The 
Constitution set the requirement for conviction by the Senate at two-thirds 
of the senators present,143 which again is likely to be the full 100 senators.  
The drafters of the Constitution designed the Senate to be more deliberative 
and less subject to political passions than the House,144 and it is telling that 
for conviction they required a two-thirds supermajority of the body they 
thought would be more insulated from partisan politics. The drafters did not 
intend impeachment to be readily available. Furthermore, this was before the 
party system developed, which in their eyes would have increased the risk 
that impeachment would be used too readily.145 Evidence from Latin 
America suggests that presidential impeachment is more common where 
 
 140.  Lee, supra note 15, at 421. 
 141.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 142.  Id. § 2, cl. 5. (granting “the sole power of impeachment” to the House of Representatives). 
 143.  Id. § 3, cl. 6. 
 144.  See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 457 (James Madison) (Floating Press 2011) (“The 
necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield 
to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and 
pernicious resolutions.”).  
 145.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 479–80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Floating Press 2011) (“The 
prosecution of [impeachments] . . . will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and 
to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself 
with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on 
one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will 
be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or 
guilt.”). 
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political parties are more fragmented,146 so now that the U.S. has developed 
into a stable system of two parties with relatively equal representation in the 
Senate, conviction and removal is unlikely unless the case is extremely 
strong.  Of the twenty cases in which the House has voted to impeach, the 
Senate has voted to acquit in eight, including all three impeached 
presidents.147 The only impeachments that have proceeded to conviction and 
removal by the Senate have involved lower court judges, and generally their 
wrongdoing has been clear.148 
The Korean Constitution is similar to the U.S. with respect to voting at 
the first stage of impeachment, carried out by the 100 member National 
Assembly.  For typical National Assembly actions, the Korean Constitution 
requires a simple majority to constitute a quorum, and a simple majority of 
those members present to take action.149 With respect to impeachment votes, 
however, Korea raised the bar in several ways.  First, a motion to impeach 
must be brought by one-third of the members, in the case of non-presidential 
impeachments, and a majority of the members in the case of a presidential 
impeachment.150  This kind of procedural requirement does not exist in the 
U.S. Constitution,151 and would be up to the procedural rules of the House 
with respect to the role of committees in bringing forward motions to 
impeach.152  Assuming an impeachment motion is successfully brought, the 
votes required for approval again differ depending on who is being 
impeached, with a majority of the total National Assembly, not merely a 
majority of a quorum, required for a non-presidential impeachment, and two-
thirds of the total National Assembly required for a presidential 
 
 146.  PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, supra note 20, at 156. 
 147.  See List of Individuals Impeached, supra note 4. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 49 (S. Kor.). 
 150.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 65(2) (S. Kor.). 
 151.  The relevant provision simply states that “The House of Representatives shall . . . have the sole 
Power of Impeachment.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.  
 152.  The House has no generally applicable procedural rules governing impeachments. Brian 
Naylor, Fact Check: White House Legal Argument Against Impeachment Inquiry, NPR (Oct. 9, 2019, 
1:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/09/768540896/who-sets-the-rules-when-is-it-real-and-other-
big-questions-on-impeachment [https://perma.cc/FQ5N-78KG]. The procedural rules governing any 
specific impeachment must therefore be found in resolutions adopted by the House and by the relevant 
committees, most importantly the Committee on the Judiciary. See Elizabeth Rybicki & Michael Greene, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45769, THE IMPEACHMENT PROCESS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2–6 
(2019). For the Trump impeachment, the key documents are House Resolution 660, adopted on October 
31, 2019, which identifies the relevant committees and their responsibilities, and the “Impeachment 
Inquiry Procedures in the Committee on the Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 660,” submitted for printing in 
the Congressional Record on October 29, 2019. H.R. Res. 660, 116th Cong. (2019); 165 Cong. Rec. 
E1357 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 2019). 
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impeachment.153  The Korean Constitution thus formally establishes a two-
stage process at the National Assembly level through the separate motion 
requirement, whereas in the U.S. a similar result is normally accomplished 
by the House holding one vote to formally begin impeachment proceedings, 
subsequently voting on articles of impeachment to be presented to the 
Senate.154  Although the requirements for the two votes in the House are 
lower than the requirements for the two votes in Korea’s National Assembly, 
especially with respect to presidential impeachments, the fact that the Korean 
party system is more fractured and fluid than the U.S. may reduce the 
constraining effect of Korea’s higher voting threshold.155  The fact that the 
National Assembly impeached two presidents in the first thirty years of 
Korea’s democratic constitution, while the U.S. House has impeached three 
presidents in 230 years,156 provides some support for this view. 
Although voting in the first phase of the impeachment process is largely 
similar in the U.S. and Korea, voting in the second, adjudicatory, phase is 
substantially different. In Korea, an impeachment by the National Assembly 
moves for adjudication to the Constitutional Court, which consists of nine 
justices who normally rule by simple majority.  For impeachment decisions, 
however, the Constitution requires a supermajority of six or more,157 which 
again would seem to be a high bar.  In terms of voting requirements, the 
Korean system, like the U.S., thus seems designed to favor under-inclusion, 
possibly leaving someone in office for whom impeachment might seem 
appropriate to many.  Nonetheless, the Korean constitution limits presidents 
to single five-year terms.158 So even if an impeachment fails, a president’s 
critics will not be forced to tolerate his leadership too much longer.  In the 
U.S., which has a two-term presidential limit, those who drove President 
Trump’s impeachment could see him elected again. If they do, it will be 
 
 153.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 65(2) (S. Kor.). 
 154.  See Molly E. Reynolds & Margaret Taylor, What Powers Does a Formal Impeachment Inquiry 
Give the House?, LAWFARE (May 21, 2019, 1:57 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-powers-does-
formal-impeachment-inquiry-give-house [https://perma.cc/P7VW-BVSG]. In the Trump impeachment, 
committees of the House began impeachment-related investigations before the full House voted on 
whether to begin an impeachment inquiry. Bryan Naylor, Impeachment Timeline: From Early Calls to a 
Full House Vote, NPR (Dec. 17, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/17/788397365/ 
impeachment-timeline-from-early-calls-to-a-full-house-vote [https://perma.cc/5GMK-RGEM]. This 
explains why the Judiciary Committee adopted procedural rules on September 9, 2019, several weeks 
before the full House voted to adopt Resolution 660, and why Resolution 660 directs various committees 
to “continue their ongoing investigations as part of the existing House of Representatives inquiry” into 
impeaching Trump. H.R. Res. 660.  
 155.  Lee, supra note 15, at 408–12 (discussing how the fragile political landscape and an alliance 
between opposition parties culminated in Roh’s impeachment). 
 156.  List of Individuals Impeached, supra note 4. 
 157.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 113(1) (S. Kor.). 
 158.  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 70 (S. Kor.). 
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interesting to see whether they mount another impeachment campaign 
against him.  There is no rule against it, and political passions in the U.S. 
show no sign of cooling. 
C. Structuring Impeachment Through Precedent 
Another important dimension on which internal impeachment 
mechanisms can vary is the extent to which decisions are constrained by 
precedent.  A concern for precedent could arise with respect to major issues, 
such as the definition of an impeachable offense, but also many more 
technical issues, such as decisions concerning procedures in the charging and 
the adjudicating bodies.  The U.S. impeachment regime does not display a 
strong commitment to precedent,159 whereas the Korean regime seems more 
committed.  With respect to the definition of “high crimes and 
misdemeanors,” there is no formal mechanism in the U.S. system by which 
future houses of Congress might be bound to follow the interpretations of 
earlier houses.  Judicial review supports respect for precedent in the ordinary 
legal system, but the U.S. stance against judicial review of impeachments 
seems solid.  The doctrine of stare decisis supports respect for precedent by 
ordinary courts even absent the possibility of review by higher courts, but 
the House and the Senate do not recognize stare decisis in impeachments. 
The procedural rules that the House and the Senate have adopted, discussed 
above, are also not judicially enforceable, though the Senate has at least 
enacted basic procedural rules that it leaves in place, while the House enacts 
procedural rules for each impeachment.  By contrast, the Korean 
impeachment regime appears to allow a larger potential role for precedent to 
provide structure, largely because of the role of statutes, and the role of the 
Constitutional Court as the adjudicating body.160  In addition to the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court Act also structures the Korean 
impeachment system,161 and that statute can be judicially enforced.  The fact 
that the Constitutional Court adjudicates Korean impeachments also 
suggests that precedent plays some greater constraining role, though as with 
all high courts it is debatable to what extent precedent actually constrains 
that court’s own decisions.  It is attractive to think that vesting a court with 
the role of adjudicating impeachments may depoliticize decisions, but doing 
so could politicize the court, rather than depoliticizing impeachment 
decisions.  Korea’s Constitutional Court has struggled to appear as a court 
 
 159.  See GERHARDT, supra note 36, at 47–53. 
 160.  Lee, supra note 15, at 421. 
 161.  Hunbeob jaepanso beob [Constitutional Court Act] art. 2 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea 
Legislation Research Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do? 
hseq=47509&lang=ENG [https://perma.cc/WLS5-E3PJ]. 
JO. IMPEACHMENT MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2021  8:31 PM 
296 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:259 
when ruling on presidential impeachments, despite going out of its way to 
emphasize during the Noh impeachment that impeachment in Korea is a 
legal not a political process.162 
VI. BROADER POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The legal rules and institutions discussed above, both contextual and 
internal to impeachment, operate within national political systems that both 
determine and are determined by those legal structures.  The law and the 
politics of impeachment are deeply intertwined, with the legal rules 
structuring the political maneuvering in the short term, but with political 
forces able to control at least some of the legal structures, especially those 
that are sub-constitutional, and therefore more easily changed.  Individual 
countries will differ according to whether law or politics dominates at any 
given moment, but both matter for purposes of building a framework for 
comparison there is no point in asserting that one or the other predominates. 
One of the most fundamental normative questions any presidential 
system must consider is how readily available presidential impeachment 
should be.  Although there can be no right answer, some general 
considerations seem clear.  In a stable, two-party system like the U.S., where 
legislators do not face term limits, neither individual legislators nor the 
dominant political parties would normally have a strong incentive to 
impeach a president.  Members of both parties can easily imagine a president 
of their own party being subjected to the distraction of an impeachment 
attempt by a hostile House of Representatives.  Although the supermajority 
requirement for conviction by the Senate makes conviction and removal very 
unlikely, allowing impeachment efforts to develop into a tit-for-tat pattern 
whenever different parties controlled the House and the presidency would 
make it hard for either party to enjoy a successful presidency unless it also 
controlled the House.  Individual House members in competitive districts, 
concerned about reelection every two years, would also seem to have little 
incentive to pursue questionable impeachment cases. However, that would 
depend on whether they would benefit more from exciting their partisan 
supporters, or appealing to moderates who are likely to favor impeachment 
only in very clear cases.  Legislators from relatively safe and highly partisan 
districts, on the other hand, might be more open to impeachment efforts, 
especially with respect to a president from an opposing political party. 
The work of political scientists is especially helpful for understanding 
the wider political contexts within which impeachment regimes operate.  
Those who have engaged in comparative impeachment scholarship 
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emphasize what Perez-Linan calls “legislative shields” that is, groups of 
legislators who oppose impeachment and are able to utilize the tools 
available within the relevant legal regime to block it.163  Building a 
legislative shield in Perez-Linan’s sense will be easier for a president if the 
legal thresholds for impeachment are high, as in the case of the U.S. Senate, 
but it will also be easier if his or her party controls a significant number of 
seats in the legislature, and if many members of the opposite party are not 
sure they or their party will benefit from pursuing an impeachment.  By this 
logic, presidents of countries with fragmented, multi-party systems, are more 
likely to be impeached, other things being equal, because they will have more 
trouble building effective legislative shields if they become unpopular.  
Small parties and individual politicians who may have voted with the 
president’s party on particular issues will not be constrained from defecting 
by party discipline or by long-term, repeat-player interests, factors that 
weigh against impeachment in stable, two-party systems.164 
Impeachment in Korea may be subject to this dynamic, as was noted 
with respect to the Noh impeachment, as Korea’s parties tend to fragment, 
defect, and regroup fairly regularly.165  Whether that will result in 
impeachment being too common is a much more difficult question.  
Impeachment has become common in Latin America compared to other 
regions, but whether that represents a serious problem is contested.  Some 
analysts characterize impeachment in Latin America as a functional 
substitute for the military coups that formerly plagued the region,166 and cast 
in that light, increasing resort to impeachment may represent progress.  As 
Perez-Linan describes Latin America’s evolution from coups to 
impeachments, “[a]s in previous decades, democratically elected 
governments continue to fall, but in contrast to previous decades, democratic 
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regimes do not break down.”167  Korea is on its fifth constitution since 
becoming fully independent in 1948,168 and between 1948 and 1987, when 
democracy was achieved and the current constitution enacted, the country 
suffered two military coups and a presidential assassination.169  Under the 
current constitution, Presidents Noh and Park have been impeached, and 
Park convicted and removed by the Constitutional Court, but the democratic 
regime itself has continued.  The Korean impeachment regime may function 
in such a way as to make impeachment more common than it has been in the 
U.S.,170 but if that helps stabilize Korea’s democracy, Koreans may well 
approve. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The structure of this essay is based upon a few key characteristics of 
impeachment regimes, identified primarily by treating the U.S. and Korean 
systems as bases for ideal impeachment regime types, viewed through the 
familiar jurisprudential lens of over and under-inclusiveness.  Some of those 
characteristics help determine the place of impeachment within the larger 
political system, while others are internal to the impeachment process itself.  
Ultimately, whether a given impeachment regime functions in a way that is 
over or under-inclusive is a political judgment for the citizens of that society 
to make, but systematic knowledge of how and why impeachment operates 
in other societies may help people better understand the merits and demerits 
of their own systems. 
There is much more to be said about impeachment from a comparative 
perspective, but hopefully this essay will be useful to others interested in 
such inquiries.  Unless we compare, we are limited to single-country studies, 
which don’t allow one to say much about impeachment in general, a 
mechanism that is both available and important in many societies.  Single-
country studies also have the potential to mislead; what one might attribute 
to the legal rules in a country might actually be caused by the structure of its 
political parties, or some other extra-legal factor, and that would be apparent 
if a second country’s impeachment regime had the same legal rules but 
functioned differently.  In this way, comparative work can contribute to the 
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social scientific enterprise of identifying variables, formulating and testing 
hypotheses, and trying to understand causal forces behind the visible results.  
Such work has to take into account both legal and political factors, however, 
as impeachment regimes combine law and politics, both of which affect the 
regimes’ ultimate functioning. 
It is important at this point to return to a caveat offered at the beginning 
of this essay, which is that comparative scholarship will not answer ultimate 
questions about the meaning of an impeachment for a society, and that a 
more anthropological approach might be more appropriate if that is the 
question being asked.  As the Trump impeachment has demonstrated in the 
U.S., and as the Noh and Park impeachments demonstrated in Korea, the 
meaning may well be as contested as the impeachment itself.  What does it 
mean that in the Trump impeachment the House and Senate both voted on 
nearly perfectly partisan lines, the first to impeach and the second to acquit?  
Does it mean that the Republican party debased itself by not standing up to 
Trump’s bombast and removing him from office?  Or, is the meaning of this 
impeachment episode that the Democrats in the House did such a poor job 
of investigating Trump and putting together articles of impeachment that the 
Republicans acted appropriately in summarily rejecting the case in the 
Senate?  Americans remained divided on such issues after the Trump 
impeachment process had ended,171 and Korean public opinion remained 
divided after the Park impeachment as well.172 
As wrenching for a society as an impeachment can be, especially 
impeachment of a president, it is crucial for democracy that the possibility 
of impeachment exist.  For the possibility to exist, there must be rules and 
processes to carry it out, and the goal of this paper has been to bring key 
rules and processes to the surface for examination.  Many choices go into the 
construction and operation of an impeachment regime, and if those choices 
and their normative implications are more clearly understood, perhaps 
impeachment will become more of the not-too-much-not-too-little good that 
democratic societies need it to be. 
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